The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1214 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1214.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तमभिलापिनी ।
प्रतीतिः कल्पना क्लृप्तिहेतुत्वाद्यात्मिका न तु ॥ १२१४ ॥

pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntamabhilāpinī |
pratītiḥ kalpanā klṛptihetutvādyātmikā na tu || 1214 ||

Sense-perception is free from conceptual content and not erroneous.—‘Conceptual content’ is idea associated with verbal expression; it is not [regarded as] the basis of verbal expression, etc.—(1214)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘Sense-perception’ as a Means of Cognition consists of the Eye and the rest and is (a) conceptual (determinate), or (b) of the nature of ‘Non-cognition Such is the diversity of opinion regarding the nature of Sense-perception.—By rejecting this, the Author propounds his own definition of it:—[see verse 1214 above]

The character of being ‘Sense-perception’ is what is predicated of that Cognition which has been described as ‘free from conceptual content and not erroneous’; as in every case, it is the defined thing (distinguishing feature) that is predicated. [The meaning therefore is—‘That Cognition which is free from conceptual content and is not erroneous is Sense-perception’];—as is found in the case of such expressions as ‘That which shakes is the Aśvattha—The thing defined here is Sense-perception; as it is the definition of tins that forms the subject-matter of the present Context. It is not the definition of ‘freedom from conceptual content and non-erroneous-ness’ that is the subject-matter of the Context; by virtue of which this latter could be taken as predicated in the sentence.

The ‘Cognition’ has not been mentioned, because it is already implied in the negation of ‘Conceptual Content’; just as in the case of the sentence ‘Bring the milch one without the calf’, where the cow is not mentioned, as it is already implied by the negation of the calf.

Question:—“What is it that is meant by the term ‘Conceptual Content’ (‘Kalpanā’), freedom from which serves as the differentia of Sense-perception?”

Answer:—‘Conceptual Content is idea associated with verbal expression’.

Question:—“Is that Kalpanā also to be admitted, against which, in the character of being the basis of verbal expression, Śaṅkarasvāmin and others have urged objections in great detail?”

Answer:—No; it is not the basis of verbal expression;—‘regarded as’—this has to be taken as understood. Hence the objections that have been urged on that score are not applicable to our view; because we do not accept that view.

Klṛpti’ is verbal expression (‘being spoken, of’, ‘being named’); and the basis for such expression consists of the Universal, the Name and so forth; since there can be no speaking of things without such distinguishing features as consist of the Universal, etc.

The term ‘ādi’ (etcetera)—in the text is meant to include such characteristics as Doubt and Deliberation, as leading to association with words etc., and also the assumption of the apprehender and the apprehended and so forth.

Abhilāpa’—is expressive word; and it is in a generic form; that Idea which appears as associated with that word is called ‘abhilāpinī’—(1214)

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