Verse 835-839

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यद्येकः समवायः स्यात्सर्वेष्वेव च वस्तुषु ।
कपालादिष्वपि ज्ञानं पटादीति प्रसज्यते ॥ ८३५ ॥
गजादिष्वपि गोत्वादि समस्तीत्यनुषज्यते ।
ततो गवादिरूपत्वममीषां शावलेयवत् ॥ ८३६ ॥
पटस्तन्तुषु योऽस्तीति समवायात्प्रतीयते ।
अस्ति चासौ कपालेषु तस्येति न तथेति किम् ॥ ८३७ ॥
नाश्रितः स कपाले चेन्ननु तन्तुष्वपीष्यते ।
आश्रितः समवायेन स कपालेऽपि नास्ति किम् ॥ ८३८ ॥
तन्तोर्यः समवायो हि पटस्येत्यभिधीयते ।
स घटस्य कपालेषु तद्धीरनवधिर्भवेत् ॥ ८३९ ॥

yadyekaḥ samavāyaḥ syātsarveṣveva ca vastuṣu |
kapālādiṣvapi jñānaṃ paṭādīti prasajyate || 835 ||
gajādiṣvapi gotvādi samastītyanuṣajyate |
tato gavādirūpatvamamīṣāṃ śāvaleyavat || 836 ||
paṭastantuṣu yo'stīti samavāyātpratīyate |
asti cāsau kapāleṣu tasyeti na tatheti kim || 837 ||
nāśritaḥ sa kapāle cennanu tantuṣvapīṣyate |
āśritaḥ samavāyena sa kapāle'pi nāsti kim || 838 ||
tantoryaḥ samavāyo hi paṭasyetyabhidhīyate |
sa ghaṭasya kapāleṣu taddhīranavadhirbhavet || 839 ||

If there were one and the same inherence in all things, then the notion of ‘cloth’ should appear in the potsherd also; it would also follow that the universal ‘cow’ subsists in the elephant also; so that the elephant also should have the form of the cow, just like the variegated cow.—The notion that ‘the cloth subsists in the yarns’ is based upon inherence; this same inherence, being present in the potsherds also, why is it that there is no such notion as that ‘the cloth subsists in the potsherds’?—If it be urged that this is so for the simple reason that the cloth does not subsist in the potsherds,—then the answer is that in the yarns also, it subsists only by inherence; is this inherence then not present in the potsherds? In fact the inherence of the cloth in the yarns must be the same as the inherence of the cloth [read ‘paṭasya’ acc. to comm.] in the potsherds; and hence there could be no restriction in the notion at all.—(835-839)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued by the Opponent (under Text 825, above) that—“Inasmuch as one and the same notion of ‘this subsisting in that’ is equally present in all cases, Inherence does not vary like Conjunction”.—

This is answered in the following:—[see verses 835-839 above]

If there were only one ‘Inherence’ in all the Three Worlds, then, such notions also should appear as ‘the Cloth in the Potsherds’, and also that the Universal ‘Cow’ subsists in the House; and hence just as the notion of ‘Cow’ appears in regard to the variegated Cow, so should it appear also in regard to the Elephant.

Then again, the notion that ‘the Cloth subsists in the Yams’ has been explained as being due to the influence of Inherence; this Inherence of the Cloth is present in the Potsherds also; why then should there not be a similar notion—‘The Cloth in the Potsherds’—in regard to the Potsherds also?

It might be argued that—“inasmuch as the Cloth does not subsist in the Potsherds, the said notion does not appear.”

This cannot be true. Because the notion that the Cloth subsists in the yarns is also said to be so only on the strength of Inherence; is not this same Inherence present in the Potsherds also—on account of which there could be no such notion as ‘the Cloth subsists in the Potsherds’ also, just as in the Yarns?—As a matter of fact, that Inherence of the Cloth which is said to be present in the yarns should be the same as that of the Cloth in the Potsherds. Under the circumstances, wherefore should not there be an admixture of the notions of things (and the consequent confusion)? For these reasons, there could be no restriction in the notion at all; and as a result of this, the relation of Substance, Quality and Action with their respective qualifications—in the shape of the Universal ‘Substance’, ‘Quality’ and

‘Action’,—being one and the same, any division among the said Categories would be impossible.—(835-839)

The following Text propounds the possibility of the notion of ‘Cow’ in regard to the Elephant:—[see verse 840 next]