Verse 831-834

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

वृक्षे शाखाः शिलाश्चाग इत्येषा लौकिकी मतिः ।
अगाख्यपरिशिष्टाङ्गनैरन्तर्योपलम्भनात् ॥ ८३१ ॥
तौ पुनस्तास्विति ज्ञानं लोकातिक्रान्तमुच्यते ।
घटे रूपं क्रियादीति तादात्म्यं त्ववगच्छति ॥ ८३२ ॥
रूपकुम्भादिशब्दा हि सर्वावस्थाभिधायकाः ।
तद्विशेषाभिधानाय तथा ते विनिवेशिताः ॥ ८३३ ॥
तानाश्रित्यैषु विज्ञानं तेनाकारेण वर्त्तते ।
समवायान्न भेदस्य सर्वेषामप्यनीक्षणात् ॥ ८३४ ॥

vṛkṣe śākhāḥ śilāścāga ityeṣā laukikī matiḥ |
agākhyapariśiṣṭāṅganairantaryopalambhanāt || 831 ||
tau punastāsviti jñānaṃ lokātikrāntamucyate |
ghaṭe rūpaṃ kriyādīti tādātmyaṃ tvavagacchati || 832 ||
rūpakumbhādiśabdā hi sarvāvasthābhidhāyakāḥ |
tadviśeṣābhidhānāya tathā te viniveśitāḥ || 833 ||
tānāśrityaiṣu vijñānaṃ tenākāreṇa varttate |
samavāyānna bhedasya sarveṣāmapyanīkṣaṇāt || 834 ||

The notion that does appear in ordinary experience is in the form ‘the branches in the tree’, ‘the stones in the hill’; and this notion proceeds from the fact that the two (the branch and the stones) are perceived to be in close contact with the other portions of the two ‘immovables’ (tree and hill). The notion that ‘those two (tree and mountain) subsist in these (branches and the stones)’ however that is put forward (by the opponent) is one that is beyond all ordinary experience.—What such notions as ‘this colour or that action in this jar’ apprehend is identity; the general terms ‘colour’ (‘action’), ‘jar’ connote these things generally, in all states and conditions; hence for the purpose of mentioning their particular forms, they are spoken of in the manner expressed in the said notions ‘and it is on the basis of those particular forms that the notion appears in that form,—not on the basis of ‘inherence’ because the distinction among all these is not perceived.—(831-834)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

In ordinary life such notions are met with as ‘The Branches in the Tree’, ‘The Stones in the Hill’,—and not such as ‘The Tree in the Branches’, ‘the Hill in the Stones That notion also of ‘the Branches in the Tree’ is not due to ‘Inherence’; it is due to the fact that the two (Branches and Stones) are perceived in close contact with portions of ‘the two immovables’, other than the Tree and Stones spoken of,—those other portions being the Trunk of the Tree, and the Base of the Hill.—The term ‘immovables’ is meant to stand for both, the Tree and the Hill, in view of the fact that both are equally immovable.

‘Those two’;—the Hill and the Tree.

‘In these’;—in the Stones and in the Branches.

Question—“There are many such well-known notions among people as ‘The Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, and Action in the Jar’; what could be the basis of such a notion, except Inherence?”

Answer:—‘What such notions, etc. etc.’—‘Identity’, i.e. Being of the nature of the Jar; this is what is apprehended by the said notion,—or by men. When ‘Colour’ is spoken of as ‘in the Jar’, what is meant is that the Colour is of the nature of the Jar, not that it is the same as the Jar. When there is a desire to speak of certain common potencies like those of Colour and the rest, and yet to distinguish those present in things other than the Jar, one introduces the term ‘Jar’ (and uses the expression ‘the Colour in the Jar’). Each of the terms ‘Colour’ and the rest, by itself, is used for the purpose of connoting the specific capacity of each of those factors to bring about the visual and other cognitions specifically; thus it is that the term ‘Jar’ just indicates those diverse factors; thus there being no co-ordination between the two, the sameness of form is explained on the basis of different substratum.

“Why then are both the terms used?”

Answer:—‘The general terms, etc. etc.’:—The term ‘Colour’ connotes Colour in general, in all sorts of conditions; for instance, just as the Colour in the Jar is spoken of as ‘Colour’, so also is the colour in the Cloth; hence the word ‘Colour’ by itself does not connote anything in particular,—as to which particular Colour is meant. When, however, the expression used is ‘the Colour in the Jar’, the Colour connoted is that particular one which is in the form of the Jar, as distinguished from that in the Cloth and other things. Similarly, the term ‘Jar’ also connotes the Jar under all conditions,—white, yellow, moving, not moving and so forth; hence the word by itself does not connote anything particular; but when the expression ‘the white colour in the Jar’ is used, the notion that appears is that of the white Jar as distinguished from other jars. Thus it is that when one wishes to speak of this particular Jar, the words are used in the form ‘Colour in the Jar’,

It is on the basis of such expressions that there appears the notion of the Colour in the Jar, in reference to the Jar. It is not on the basis of any such thing as ‘Inherence’, The reason for this is next stated—‘Because the Distinction, etc. etc.’;—there is no difference apprehended among ‘Inherence’, ‘Jar’ and ‘Colour’,—on the basis of which the said notion could be said to be based upon ‘Inherence’.

What is meant by this is that the Reason adduced by the Opponent is ‘inconclusive’ and his Conclusion is annulled by Inference and other means of cognition.—(831-834)