Verse 798-801

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अपिचानेकवृत्तित्वं सामान्यस्य यदुच्यते ।
तत्र केयं मता वृत्तिः स्थितिः किं व्यक्तिरेव वा ॥ ७९८ ॥
स्वरूपाप्रच्युतिस्तावत्स्थितिरस्य स्वभावतः ।
नाधारस्तत्कृतौ शक्तो येन स्थापकता भवेत् ॥ ७९९ ॥
गमनप्रतिबन्धोऽपि न तस्य बदरादिवत् ।
विद्यते निष्क्रियत्वेन नाधारोऽतः प्रकल्प्यते ॥ ८०० ॥
स्थितिस्तत्समवायश्चेन्न तदेव विचार्यते ।
सोऽभीष्टोऽयुतसिद्धानामाश्रयाश्रयितात्मकः ॥ ८०१ ॥

apicānekavṛttitvaṃ sāmānyasya yaducyate |
tatra keyaṃ matā vṛttiḥ sthitiḥ kiṃ vyaktireva vā || 798 ||
svarūpāpracyutistāvatsthitirasya svabhāvataḥ |
nādhārastatkṛtau śakto yena sthāpakatā bhavet || 799 ||
gamanapratibandho'pi na tasya badarādivat |
vidyate niṣkriyatvena nādhāro'taḥ prakalpyate || 800 ||
sthitistatsamavāyaścenna tadeva vicāryate |
so'bhīṣṭo'yutasiddhānāmāśrayāśrayitātmakaḥ || 801 ||

It is averred that the ‘universal subsists in several things’. What is this ‘subsistence’ meant to be?—Is it staying? Or being manifested? As for ‘staying’, which stands for not deviating from its own form,—this belongs to the universal by its very nature;—any receptacle of it gould not produce this in it, by virtue of which that substratum could be regarded as ‘that which makes it stay as for preventing its movement (which is another form of ‘subsistence’), it cannot belong to the universal, as it does to the jujube fruit (contained in the cup); because the universal is, by its nature, immobile; hence it cannot have a receptacle.—If it be held that ‘staying’ is inherence,—that cannot be accepted; as it is the exact nature of this ‘inherence’ that is being examined. In the form of the relation of the sustainer and sustained which subsists among things never found apart from each other, such ‘inherence’ is admitted by us also.—(798-801)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Having thus pointed out the defects in the arguments adduced by the other party, for the proving of the Universal, the Author proceeds to advance arguments against the very Conception of the Universal.—[see verses 798-801 above]

It is essential that the subsistence of the Universal in the diverse Individuals should be admitted,; if it were not, then how could there be, on the basis of that Universal, any comprehensive notion of one and the same form specifically in connection with those things?—Now this ‘subsistence’ of the Universal, when it is there, could be either in the form of staying or in that of being manifested. Staying also is of two kinds—not deviating from its own form and having its downward movement checked.—The former is not possible in the ease in question; because, being eternal, the Universal would, by its own nature, never deviate from its own form. Nor can it be the latter; because the Universal is incorporeal and all-pervading, and hence it can have no movement; so that downward, movement would not be possible; hence it cannot be right to assume the checking of any movement.

The answer that what is meant by the ‘subsistence’ of the Universal in the diverse things is its inherence in these,—would be no answer at all; as it is just this ‘Inherence’ the exact nature of which is being considered.—For instance, ‘Inherence’ has been defined as the relation of sustainer and sustained, that subsists in things never found apart from each other. Now what is being considered is whether this character of being sustained is of the nature of its staying being restricted, or of being manifested. In the case of entirely distinct things, it cannot be right to postulate any such distinct thing as ‘Inherence’ which can serve no useful purpose; as such postulating would lead to absurdities,—as in that ease everything would ‘inhere’ in every other thing. Because ‘Inherence’ has been postulated as that which combines things which are distinguished from one another; but even when there is such a distinct thing as ‘Inherence’, things which are essentially different do not assume one another’s form; for, if they did, they would lose their own form.—In giving the name of ‘Inherence’ to that other thing, there can be no dispute.—From all this it follows that the ‘staying’ (of the Universal in the diverse things) cannot be anything different.—(798-801)