Verse 802-804

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

स्यादाधारो जलादीनां गमनप्रतिबन्धकः ।
अगतीनां किमाधारैः सामान्यानां प्रकल्पितैः ॥ ८०२ ॥
स्वज्ञानोत्पत्तियोग्यत्वे किमभिव्यक्तिकारणैः ।
स्वज्ञानोत्पत्त्ययोग्यत्वे किमभिव्यक्तिकारणैः ॥ ८०३ ॥
ह्यः समर्थः समर्थात्मा व्यञ्जकैः क्रियते यदि ।
भावोऽस्थिरो भवेदेवं दीपव्यङ्ग्यघटादिवत् ॥ ८०४ ॥

syādādhāro jalādīnāṃ gamanapratibandhakaḥ |
agatīnāṃ kimādhāraiḥ sāmānyānāṃ prakalpitaiḥ || 802 ||
svajñānotpattiyogyatve kimabhivyaktikāraṇaiḥ |
svajñānotpattyayogyatve kimabhivyaktikāraṇaiḥ || 803 ||
hyaḥ samarthaḥ samarthātmā vyañjakaiḥ kriyate yadi |
bhāvo'sthiro bhavedevaṃ dīpavyaṅgyaghaṭādivat || 804 ||

In the case of water and such things, there may be a ‘receptacle’ which prevents their downward movement; in the case of üniversals however, which are immobile, what would be the use of receptacles?—In the case of what is capable of bringing about its own cognition, what would be the use of any causes of manifestation?—And also in the case of what is incapable of bringing about its own cognition, what would be the use of any causes of manifestation? If what was incapable yesterday were made capable (to-day), then the thing would be impermanent,—just like the jar manifested by the lamp.—(802-804)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Texts proceed to show that it is absolutely incongruous to assume a ‘receptacle’ for the ‘Universal’—[see verses 802-804 above]

‘Agatīnām’, ‘Immobile’—which are devoid of movement. The absence of movement in the Universal is implied by its incorporeality and all-pervading character.

Nor can the ‘subsistence’ of the Universal in the Individuals be of the nature of being?nanifested. Because the ‘manifestation’ of the Universal could only consist in bringing about its Cognition, not in any strengthening of its character, because the character of an eternal thing cannot be changed. Under the circumstances, if the Universal has the capacity of bringing about its own Cognition, then why should it need any other cause for its ‘manifestation’?—If, on the other hand, it does not possess the capacity of bringing about its own Cognition, then it would not be reasonable to assert its dependence on something else, as by its very nature, the Universal is such that nothing can be introduced into it by other things.—If it be held that other things do introduce peculiar features into the Universal, then, like the Individual, it would become specific, and cease to be Universal.

The thing, etc. etc.—The entire category ‘Universal’ is held to be based upon the name and notion of ‘existence’, [hence ‘bhāva’ here stands for the thing Universal, in that sense].

The argument may be formulated as follows:—When there is no basis for one thing subsisting in another, then it cannot subsist in this latter,—e.g. the Himālaya in the Vindhya;—there is no basis for the subsistence of the Universal in the Individuals;—hence there is non-apprehension of the wider ‘term’ (which implies the negation of the narrower term).—(802-804)