Verse 796-797

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

गोतश्चार्थान्तरं गोत्वं भिन्नधीविषयत्वतः ।
रूपस्पर्शादिवत्तस्येत्युक्तेश्चैत्रतुरङ्गवत् ॥ ७९६ ॥
इत्यस्मिन्व्यभिचारोक्तिः पाचकत्वादिभिस्तथा ।
अनया च दिशाऽन्येऽपि सर्वे दूष्याः कुहेतवः ॥ ७९७ ॥

gotaścārthāntaraṃ gotvaṃ bhinnadhīviṣayatvataḥ |
rūpasparśādivattasyetyukteścaitraturaṅgavat || 796 ||
ityasminvyabhicāroktiḥ pācakatvādibhistathā |
anayā ca diśā'nye'pi sarve dūṣyāḥ kuhetavaḥ || 797 ||

“The universal ‘cow’ is something distinct from the individual cow, because it forms the object of a different idea,—like colour, touch and the like;—also because it is spoken of as belonging to that, just as the horse is spoken of as belonging to caitra”,—this argument may be shown to be ‘fallible’ (untrue) in view of the notion of the ‘cook’ and so forth.—In this same manner, other wrong arguments also are to be discredited.—(796-797)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued (by Bhāvivikta, under Text 720) that—“the Universal Cow is something different from the Cow, etc., etc.”—The following Text shows that the Reason adduced there is found to be false, in view of the case of such notions as those of the ‘Cook’ and the like—[see verses 796-797 above]

For instance, even though the Universal ‘Cook’ is not held to be anything different from the individual Cook, yet it does become the object of diverse cognitions,—such as ‘this is a cook—that is a cook’ and so forth; there are also such verbal expressions as ‘Devadatta’s Cook-ship’, where the two things are expressed by words with different case-terminations. Thus the Reason adduced by the other party is found to be ‘Inconclusive’ because ‘too wide’,

‘Other wrong arguments’;—such as those put forward by Kumārila and others.

The following are the ‘wrong arguments’ set forth by Kumārila:—“(1) In regard to the diverse particular cows there appears the notion of ‘cow’,—this must be due to a single entity in the shape of the Universal ‘Cow’,—because it manifests the cow and is of one form just like the notion in regard to a single individual cow.—Or again (2) The notion of ‘Cow’ cannot be due to a particular Cow, the Black one for instance, or it must be due to something different from this particular Cow;—because it appears even when this particular Cow is not present;—just like the notion of ‘being made of Olay’ in regard to the Jar.—If it is asked how this Universal is said to subsist in all particular individuals,—our explanation is as follows:—This notion of ‘Cow’ (the Universal) has for its object something that subsists in everyone of the individuals;—because each individual is found to contain the whole form of the thing,—like the notion in regard to each individual.—The one-ness also of the Universal is fully established. Because even though the Universal subsists in its entire form in every individual, yet it is one only,—because it is apprehended by a cognition of one and the same form; just as the exclusion of the Brāhmaṇa by such negative terms as ‘non-brāhmaṇa—It cannot be urged against this that—‘this notion of identical form in regard to things that are different must be wrong, and hence it is not right to determine the nature of things on the strength of that notion’,—Because there is no defect in the source of this notion; nor is there any subsequent cognition that annuls this notion. Hence there being none of the causes of mistake, the assertion that it is wrong cannot be right

All these arguments have been thus formulated (by Kumārila, in Ślokavārtika—Vanavāda 44-49):—The Idea of Cow in regard to the different individual cows is based upon the one Universal ‘Cow’,—because it manifests the cow and because it is of one form,—just like the notion of the individual Cow.—The Idea of the ‘Cow’ cannot be based upon the individual Black Cow,—or it must be based upon something other than this individual,—because it is present even when the individual is not present,—just as the notion of ‘being made of clay’ in regard to the Jar.—The Idea of the ‘Cow’ has for its object everyone of the individuals in which it subsists, because it subsists in everyone of them in its complete form,—just like the notion in regard to each individual.—Even though the Universal subsists in each individual, yet it is only one,—because it is cognized as one—just like the exclusion of the Brāhmaṇa in the case of the negative term (like ‘non-brāhmaṇa—The notion of ‘one-ness’ in regard to the Universal Cow cannot be regarded as wrong;—because there is no defect in its source, nor any subsequent cognition annulling it

In the first of these arguments, the Corroborative Instance is ‘devoid of the Probandum’; because a single Universal ‘Cow’ is not admitted; hence the fact of the notion of the one individual cow being based upon that cannot also be admitted.—If what is proved is the general fact of its having a single basis, then it is superfluous; because it is admitted by us also that the notion is due to the exclusion of the non-cow, which is one only, which serves to distinguish the Cow from all heterogeneous things.

In the argument that the notion of ‘Cow’ cannot be based upon any particular Black Cow,—if what is denied is the fact of its being produced directly from it, then it is superfluous; because the producing is interposed by the apprehension of the ‘specific peculiarity’ and the ‘conception of the Convention If what is denied is the fact of even indirect production, of the notion from the individual, then the Proposition is annulled by direct experience and the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum.

Even when what is meant to be proved is that the notion is based upon something other than the individual,—if the fact of the notion being due to something else be sought to be proved even when the Black Cow is close by,—then this also is contrary to direct experience. Because as a matter of fact, it proceeds from the cognition of the Cow close by. The Corroborative Instance also is devoid of the Probandum.—If, on the other hand, what is sought to be proved is that when the Black Cow is not there, the notion of Cow that appears in the presence of the Cow of variegated colour is due to something different from the Black Cow,—then the argument is superfluous.—If then what is meant to be proved is the fact of its being due directly to the entity itself,—then the Reason is ‘inconclusive’; as it has been explained that there is no real entity (like the Universal ‘Cow’, which could form the basis of the said notion.

As for the argument that has been adduced to prove that the Universal subsists in its entire form in every individual,—there also if the fact is meant to be proved in a vague general way, then it is superfluous. Because in regard to every individual thing, its notion is based upon the notion of the thing as excluded from every otherng.

If what is meant to be proved is the fact that the notion has for its object a real entity called ‘Universal⁵ which subsists in its entire form in every individual,—then the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum and the Reason is ‘inconclusive As the concomitance of such a character is not known of anywhere. If a single thing subsisted in its entire form in several things, then all the diverse individuals would be of one and the same form; because every one of them would be associated with the same entity, ‘Universal’, subsisting in every single individual. Or the Universal itself would have to be regarded as being of diverse forms,—because at one and the same time, it subsists in its entire form in several things; just like the Bilva and other fruits placed in several vessels kept at varying distances. Bo that the argument is annulled by this Inference also.

For this same reason, the assertion that “there is no annulling cognition to the contrary” is not true. As the annulling cognition has been pointed out above and is also going to be pointed out later on.

As regards the argument in proof of the one-ness of the Universal,—there also, as it is not admitted that the Universal subsists in each individual, the fact of its being apprehended by a single cognition cannot be admitted; hence the Reason is one whose very basis is not admitted.—As regards the Exclusion of the Brāhmaṇa, it is not really one,—because it is a non-entity; hence the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum.—If the ‘one-ness’ be meant to be imaginary, then the reasoning is superfluous; because if it is imaginary, then it is already admitted by us in the form of ‘Apoha’ (Exclusion of the Contrary).

As regards the statement that “there is no defect in the source of the notion”,—that also cannot be admitted,—because the defect of the source is always there, in the shape of the beginningless influence of Ignorance.

In this same way all wrong arguments are to be disposed of.—(796-797)