Verse 628

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एकव्यापिध्रुवव्योमसमवायस्तु सिद्ध्यति ।
नैषामन्वयवैकल्यादक्रमाद्याप्तितस्तथा ॥ ६२८ ॥

ekavyāpidhruvavyomasamavāyastu siddhyati |
naiṣāmanvayavaikalyādakramādyāptitastathā || 628 ||

The subsistence of sounds in ākāśa,—which is one, all-pervading and eternal,—cannot be proved (by the reason adduced),—because it is devoid of ‘positive concomitance’;—and also because there would be absence of succession and so forth; as also universal contact.—(628)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

If, on the other hand, what is meant to be proved is that Sounds are subsistent in a particular manner,—that is, subsistent in a substance which is one, Incorporeal, external and all-pervading,—then there can be no corroborative Instance possessing the character meant to be proved; and to that extents the Reason becomes ‘inconclusive’,—This is what is shown in the following—[see verse 628 above]

‘Na-eṣām’—goes with the preceding line.

That the Opponent’s conclusion is contrary to Inference is shown in the Text by the words ‘and also because, etc.’; i.e. what has been said in the foregoing sentence to the effect that ‘the subsistence of sounds is not proved’, is so also because of the following reason:—If the Sounds were subsistent in the eternal, one substance, Ākāśa,—then like the several Sounds produced at the same time, even Sounds produced at other times would be there at the same time in question,—as their cause would be present there always in its perfect condition, and also because they would all be subsisting in the same substratum;—and it has already been explained that what is eternal cannot be dependent upon anything else; nor would it be right to regard that as ‘subsistent’ which is of no use. So that the appearance of all Sounds would cease to be successive.

The phrase ‘and so forth’ includes the anomaly of all Sounds being heard by all persons. Because the Auditory Organ consists of Ākāśa, and Ākāśa is one only,—all Sounds would reach the organ of all men and hence become heard; and on account of the impartite nature of Ākāśa, any such restriction would be impossible as that ‘this is my own Auditory Organ and that is of another person’.

The following argument might be urged:—“When the tympanum of one has been affected by his Destiny, then that portion of the Ākāśa alone which is circumscribed by that tympanum forms the Auditory Organ of that person; that is why Sound is not perceived through other openings,—such as the mouth, the nostrils and the like. And when that same Tympanum is hurt, there is deafness”.

This cannot be right; because Ākāśa being impartite, any such partition of it would be impossible. Nor can imaginary component parts bring about, through mere imagination, any effective action which can be done only by real positive entities; merely imagining Water to be Fire does not make the former to burn or ñare up.

It might be said that:—“what is meant by Ākāśa having a part is that contact with it is not pervasive”.

This also has been already answered.

Then again, under the theory in question, the Jar, the Tympanum and all such things, as being in contact with one and the same Ākāśa, would come to occupy the same point in space; because when one thing comes into contact with Ākāśa in one form, the otherng also comes into contact with it in the same form; so that other Jars and other things also would appear at the same place; because these would be in contact with Ākāśa which is in contact with the former thing;—just like the Jar already existing there. īn this way, all Sounds also would appear at one and the same place; and this would be contrary to the generally accepted notion regarding Sounds appearing far off or close by.

These are the difficulties that appear against the Opponent’s theory.—(628)