Verse 629-630

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

विशिष्टसमयोद्भूतमनस्कारनिबन्धनम् ।
परापरादिविज्ञानं न कालान्न दिशश्च तत् ॥ ६२९ ॥
निरंशैकस्वभावत्वात्पौर्वापर्याद्यसम्भवः ।
तयोः संबन्धिभेदाच्चेदेवं तौ निष्फलौ ननु ॥ ६३० ॥

viśiṣṭasamayodbhūtamanaskāranibandhanam |
parāparādivijñānaṃ na kālānna diśaśca tat || 629 ||
niraṃśaikasvabhāvatvātpaurvāparyādyasambhavaḥ |
tayoḥ saṃbandhibhedāccedevaṃ tau niṣphalau nanu || 630 ||

The notions of ‘priority and posteriority’ (and of ‘fore and aft’) are based upon a conception arising out of particular conventions; they are not due to ‘time’, nor to ‘space’. Inasmuch as these are impartite, one, ‘priority’, ‘posteriority’ and the like are not possible in them. If the notions be said to be based upon the things related to them, then they themselves become useless.—(629-630)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

As regards the arguments put forward for proving the existence of Time and Space,—these also are generally open to the charge of being ‘superfluous’; and particularly, the Reason is devoid of the necessary concomitance,—and the conclusion is annulled by Inference.—This is what is shown in the following—[see verses 629-630 above]

‘Particular Conventions’,—i.e. the understanding that the epithets ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ are to be applied to things produced before and after, and so forth;—the conception that arises out of such conventions,—is the basis of the notions in question. Thus it is that there is no mutual interdependence; as the notion is based entirely upon a particular convention. Thus then, if the other party has set out to prove only that the said notions have a cause,—then it is superfluous (as it is admitted by all parties).

If however he intends to prove that a particular Substance is that cause, then (1) there is annulment by Inference, (2) absence of concomitance, as before; and (3) the Reason is ‘contradictory’, as it proves what is contrary to the desired conclusion;—this is what is meant by the words of the Text—‘Inasmuch as these are impartite’.

‘Related to them’,—i.e. to Space and Time.

As a matter of fact, what is desired to be proved is that the notion of ‘Priority and Posteriority’ and so forth is based upon the impartite and single substances, Time and Space this is not proved (by the Reason adduced). Because a thing becomes the ‘object’ (of cognition) when it produces a cognition exactly of the same form as itself; in the case of an impartite substance, there cannot be any differentiation between ‘fore’ and ‘aft’, to which the notion of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’ could be due; thus by proving the contrary of what is desired to be proved, the Reason becomes ‘Contradictory’,

‘If the notions be said to be based, etc. etc.’;—This anticipates the answer of the Opponent. It might be argued (by the Opponent) that—“Such external and internal things as the Lamp and the Body and the like are related to Space and Time,—there is ‘priority and posteriority’ among these,—and it is this ‘priority and posteriority’ of their relatives that is attributed to Space and Time,—hence the Reason is not Contradictory

The answer to this is as follows:—‘Then they themselves become useless’,—Under the said assumption, Space and Time themselves would be useless; as what is meant to be brought about by them will have been brought about by the things related to them. For instance, Time is held to be the cause of such notions as those of the various divisions of priority and posteriority as are denoted by the terms ‘Kṣaṇa’, ‘Lava’, ‘Kāṣṭha’, ‘Kalā’, ‘Muhūrta’, ‘Ahorātra’, ‘Ardhamāsa’ and so forth (the various divisions of Time)—and Space is held to be the cause of the notions of ‘East’, ‘North’ and so forth;—and as a matter of fact, all this diversity does not belong to Space and Time; it is present in the divisions themselves; so that the assuming of Time and Space is entirely useless.—(629-630)