Verse 360-361

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

पदार्थव्यतिरिक्ते तु नाशनाम्नि कृते सति ।
भावे हेत्वन्तरैस्तस्य न किञ्चिदुपजायते ॥ ३६० ॥
तेनोपलम्भकार्यादि प्राग्वदेवानुषज्यते ।
तादवस्थ्याच्च नैवास्य युक्तमावरणाद्यपि ॥ ३६१ ॥

padārthavyatirikte tu nāśanāmni kṛte sati |
bhāve hetvantaraistasya na kiñcidupajāyate || 360 ||
tenopalambhakāryādi prāgvadevānuṣajyate |
tādavasthyācca naivāsya yuktamāvaraṇādyapi || 361 ||

If the destruction that is brought about is something different from the thing, then there is nothing produced in the thing itself by those other causes (of the said destruction); so that the effects, like the apprehension of the thing and other phenomena, should continue as before. and as the thing continues to remain in the same condition, it is not possible that there should be any ‘concealment’ etc. of it.—(360-361)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The bringing about of one thing cannot confer any benefit on another thing; if it did, then this would lead to an absurdity. Nor can it be right to assert that ‘the bringing about of the Destruction related to ang helps the thing itself’; because no relation is known to subsist bet ween them. For instance, inasmuch as the two are, ex hypothesi, different, the relation between the two cannot be one of ‘identity’; nor can the relation be that of ‘being produced from it’, as the destruction is produced only from the ‘Cause of destruction’; and there can be no other real relation between the two. Even if there were some relation between the two, as the Thing is (ex hypothesi) an established positive entity, the apprehension and other effects produced by it must also be positive entities (and Destruction is not positive):—In the compound ‘Upalambhakāryādi’, the ‘Upalambha’, ‘Apprehension’, itself is meant to be the ‘Kārya’, ‘effect’; and the term ‘ādi’, ‘and the other phenomena’, is meant to include the containing of water (of the Jar), the breaking of the thighs, and so forth.

It might be argued that—“when the thing becomes concealed—or obstructed—by the destruction, which is something different from it, it ceases to produce such effects as its own apprehension and the like.”

In answer to this it is added—‘As the thing continues to remain in the same condition, etc, etc.’—Nothing is possible as a ‘concealer’ or ‘obstructor’ of a thing unless it removes its properties or does not produce them; if it were, it would lead to absurdities. Hence it follows that, on account of its previous nature being unabandoned, unconcealed, and unobstructed, there can be no ‘concealment’ or ‘obstruction’ of the thing.—(360-361)