by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 317-318 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 317-318.
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
अगौणे चैवमेकत्वे द्रव्यपर्याययोः स्थिते ।
व्यावृत्तिमद्भवेद्द्रव्यं पर्यायाणां स्वरूपवत् ॥ ३१७ ॥
यदि वा तेऽपि पर्यायाः सर्वेऽप्यनुगतात्मकाः ।
द्रव्यवत्प्राप्नुवन्त्येषां द्रव्येणैकात्मता स्थितेः ॥ ३१८ ॥
agauṇe caivamekatve dravyaparyāyayoḥ sthite |
vyāvṛttimadbhaveddravyaṃ paryāyāṇāṃ svarūpavat || 317 ||
yadi vā te'pi paryāyāḥ sarve'pyanugatātmakāḥ |
dravyavatprāpnuvantyeṣāṃ dravyeṇaikātmatā sthiteḥ || 318 ||
The ‘one-ness’ thus between ‘substance’ and the ‘successive factors’ being not-figurative (i.e. real), the ‘substance’ also should be distributive (exclusive), like the forms of the ‘successive factors’; or those ‘successive factors’ themselves should be comprehensive in their character, like the ‘substance because the one-ness of these with ‘substance’ is duly established.—(317-318)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
When a thing is non-different from another thing which is ‘exclusive’ in its nature, the former also must be exclusive; as for example, the forms of the Successive Factors themselves;—and Substance is non-different from the Successive Factors, which are exclusive; so that there is a natural reason (for the Substance also being exclusive).—Or (the argument may be stated in another form)—When a thing is non-different from another which is inclusive in character, the former also must be inclusive; e.g. the form of the ‘Substance and the ‘Successive Factors’ in the form of Pleasure, etc. are non-different from the ‘Substance’ which is inclusive; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding these as inclusive). If this were not so, then as the fate befalling them would be different, the two would have to be regarded as different.
There is also an argument which annuls the contrary of the conclusion, in the form that—“if things possessed of contradictory properties would be regarded as one, there would be an end to all business.”—(317-318)