Verse 191-192

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

क्वचित्समाश्रितत्वं च यदीच्छादेः प्रसाध्यते ।
तत्र कारणमात्रं चेदाश्रयः परिकल्प्यते ॥ १९१ ॥
इष्टसिद्धिस्तदाधारस्त्वाश्रयश्चेन्मतस्तव ।
तथाऽपि गतिशून्यस्य निष्फलाऽऽधारकल्पना ॥ १९२ ॥

kvacitsamāśritatvaṃ ca yadīcchādeḥ prasādhyate |
tatra kāraṇamātraṃ cedāśrayaḥ parikalpyate || 191 ||
iṣṭasiddhistadādhārastvāśrayaścenmatastava |
tathā'pi gatiśūnyasya niṣphalā''dhārakalpanā || 192 ||

If (by the argument set forth under text 178), it is sought to be proved that desire and the rest must subsist somewhere,—and that the ‘cause’ only can be such a substratum,—you seek to prove what is already accepted by us. if however it is the receptacle (or container) that is meant by you to be the ‘substratum’ (of desire, etc.),—then also the assuming of a ‘receptacle’ for what is immobile is absolutely useless.—(191-192)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been, argued (under Text 178, above) that “Desire, etc. must subsist somewhere”; if, by this, all that is meant to be proved is that only the Cause is the substratum of Desire, etc., then the effort is futile; because we also do not regard Desire, etc. to be without cause; as is clear from our declaration that ‘the mind and the mental phenomena are brought about by four etc.’, ‘Parihalpyate’—asserted, meant.

If the ‘substratum’ you seek to prove is in the form of a ‘container’ (Receptacle),—then what is asserted being annulled by Inference, there can be no invariable concomitance between that and the Probans put forward.—This is what is shown by the words—‘If however it is the Receptacle, etc.,’—i.e. the receptacle of the Desire, etc. It might be possible to postulate such a ‘Receptacle’ for things with material forms, which are capable of moving about,—for whom the ‘Receptacle’ would save them from falling down; those things however which, like Pleasure and the rest, are immobile (and immaterial) can never fall down, and under the circumstances, what would any such thing as the ‘Soul’do for them, whereby it would be their ‘receptacle’? (191-192)

Objection—“When the Jujube-fruit and other things are placed in such receptacles as the jar and the like,—even though these latter do not do anything for the fruits, yet they serve as their ‘receptacle’ (container); in the same manner the Soul would be the ‘receptacle’ of Pleasure, etc.”

The answer to this is provided in the following Text:—[see verse 193 next]