by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 190 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 190.
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
तदाकारोपरक्तेन यदन्येन प्रवेद्यते ।
तस्योदाहरणत्वेऽपि भवेदन्येन संशयः ॥ १९० ॥
tadākāroparaktena yadanyena pravedyate |
tasyodāharaṇatve'pi bhavedanyena saṃśayaḥ || 190 ||
Even if the instance meant be that cognition which is cognised as tinged by the form of the thing concerned,—it would be doubtful in regard to another cognition.—(190)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
It might be argued that—“it is not mere Cognition of another person that is meant to be the Corroborative Instance, but that particular cognition which appears in the form of the thing concerned”.
The answer to this is supplied in the following Text:—[see verse 190 above]
Even so, with reference to that cognition which does appear in its own form, without any ‘cognition of another person’,—there would be doubts regarding the Probans cited, which, therefore, would remain ‘inconclusive’.
It might be urged that “the said Cognition also must be apprehended by a Cogniser different from itself,—(a) because it is prone to appearance and disappearance,—(b) because it is cognisable,—(c) because it is capable of being remembered as a means of cognition,—like the objects (of cognition)
But here also: (1) as there would be nothing to preclude the contrary of the Probandum, the negative concomitance would remain doubtful; (2) as it would involve cognition after cognition, there would be an infinite regress;—(3) there would be no ‘object’ whose appearance had not become manifested; hence, for the establishing of one ‘object’, it would be necessary to carry on a series of Cognitions, which would take up the entire life of a man.
If for fear of the ‘infinite regress’, some one cognition were accepted as appearing by itself,—then that one case would render doubtful and inconclusive the whole set of Reasons cited,—in the form ‘being liable to appearance and disappearance’ and the rest. Further, in that case, why should there be any aversion to the acceptance of the ‘self-eognisability’ of other cognitions also,—on the basis of that said one cognition?—If (in order to avoid this difficulty) it be held that the said one cognition is one whose form is not cognised at all;—even so, that cognition not being ‘un-proven’, the entire set of cognitions preceding it would be ‘not proven’,—having their appearance not manifested; and as a consequence of this, the object (of cognition) also would be ‘not proven’.—Further, as regards the opinion of the Idealists,—under which all Cognitions are self-manifested, on account of their being no ‘Cogniser’ of Cognisable things, and are not manifested by any other Cognition,—the defect in the Opponent’s reasoning, of ‘being devoid of the Probandum’ would remain absolutely unshaken.
In the same manner it may be pointed out that the other reasons—‘having its birth dependent upon Causes’ and the rest,—are open to the objection of being ‘Futile’ and so forth.
[In the opening lines of the Commentary on 171-176, above, it has been asserted by the Naiyāyika that “all particular cognitions of such cognisables as are the objects of Being, etc. etc.”];—herein the qualification that has been added to the subject of the Reasoning, is, as before, absolutely useless; as in the matter of proving the Probandum in question, they do not render any help at all. Because what is there that does not become included under the subject thus qualified?—since all my perceptional and other cognitions are declared to be apprehended by a cogniser other than the Body, sense-organs and the rest. Even if a distinction were made on the basis of some cognitions being ‘perceptional’ and some ‘inferential’ and so on,—any distinction in regard to the Subject itself would be useless; as all cognitions would have become included under the term ‘my cognitions’,—Nor even for the opposite party is any such qualified Subject known; hence the Reasons put forward are devoid of a substratum.—If it is the case that by setting up a useless qualification, another reason is put forward for the proving of the said substratum,—then the reasoner becomes subject to the ‘Clincher’ of ‘Arthāntara’, ‘Irrelevancy’—by reason of setting up something entirely unconnected with the thing under consideration.—(190)