International Affairs: A Survey

By Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIYA

The crises in the Middle East and in the Soviet satellite empire dominate the world situation to-day. Thus has once more been brought home to all thinking men and women the truth that, in the actual world as distinguished from the ideal world of imagination, issues are decided by the presence of superior force, whether it be to our liking or not. It is enough that the superior force is present. It need not be actually used. The mere threat to use it, provided that there is a conviction that it is superior, resolves the issues, however critical they may be. Superior logic may bring intellectual satisfaction. The expression of moral indignation may bring emotional satisfaction. But they have very little influence on the actual shaping of the course of events. It is only when logic and moral indignation have the help of superior force that they have a chance of winning. With superior force present, even issues, which have no logic or moral right behind them, win. This has been the course of human history, and events to-day are one more illustration of the working of this principle.

The Middle East crisis is a trial of strength between Egypt on one side and Britain and France on the other. For a long time Britain dominated the area. Its domination began in the nineteenth century when it commanded the largest amount of force in the shape of an invincible navy and vast financial resources. Russia too had similar ambitions in those days but the force at its command was inferior to that of Britain. Turkey was the legal ruler of all this area but she was too weak to resist these outsiders. The Turks were as much aggressors in this area as the British and the Russians. The only difference is that they were the earlier aggressors and because of the superior force they then had, they conquered the Middle East and Northern Africa which constituted then and which constitute now the Arab world. For four centuries they ruled over this world. The Arabs had not the strength to overthrow the Turkish rule. The attempt to overthrow it was made by the British and the Russians. The British succeeded in the attempt and the Russians failed. The last scene in this attempt was the first world war (1914-18). At the close of that war the British became rulers–either directly or indirectly, of much of the Middle East–Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt etc., with her ally France ruling over Syria and Lebanon and some regions in Northern Africa. The Arabs then welcomed the British domination as it meant the overthrow of the four hundred years old Turkish rule.

There was no question of the British or the French possessing a moral right to rule over all Arab countries. Such a rule was quite contrary to the principle of national self-determination proclaimed by the British themselves along with their French and American allies in the first world war. Having overthrown the Turks, they should have left the Arab countries to be ruled by their own people. Such a course was consistent with principles of morality and justice. But the British and French were not prepared to do it. They said that it was they that made all the effort to overthrow the previous aggressors, the Turks, and that it was just that the reward of the effort should go to those who made the effort and succeeded in it. It meant that if the Arabs wanted to become free, they should acquire the force needed to overthrow the British and the French. And the history of the years following the first world war, from 1918 to the present day, is the history of the efforts of the Arab countries of the Middle East and Northern Africa to gain this superior force to get rid of the British and the French domination once and for all.

Superiority and inferiority are only relative terms. The difference between the force at the disposal of the British and the French on one side and of the Arabs on the other became less and less as a result of the losses sustained by the former in the second world war which brought them only a pyrrhic victory. It would have grown still less if all the Arab nations had been prepared to work together under the control of one common government instead of as half a dozen independent States into which they became distributed at the end of the first world war. One of the ambitions of Colonel Nasser, the present ruler of Egypt, is to bring as many Arab States as possible under his leadership and offer a united front to the British and the French. He has not, however, succeeded in this, though the events of the last three months have revealed brighter prospects in this direction. All the same, the growing weakness of the British and the French resulted in the Arab States of the Middle East and Egypt becoming politically independent. The French have ceased to be rulers of Syria and Lebanon and the British, of Iraq, Jordan, Palestine and Egypt. Even in Northern Africa the French had to recognise the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, their former colonial dependencies, and they are engaged in a hard struggle to retain their supremacy in Algeria.

The British control over the Middle East was, like all control, both political and economic. It was most reluctantly that they yielded their political control. They have not even to-day completely yielded it because they retain bases in Iraq and Jordan and they have protectorates in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. They have a large amount of economic control through the oil companies exploiting the oil resources of the area. The source of much of the prosperity of these countries is their oil. Three fourths of the world’s oil reserves are said to be in the Middle East and as oil will continue to be the most important fuel until atomic energy is produced on an economic scale, those like the British, who are already in possession of these resources, are not disposed to give it up. If, for any reason, the British and the French find themselves unable to get oil from the Middle East, their economic decline is certain, and they will have to be satisfied with a low standard of living. It is through the Suez Canal that they get most of the supplies of oil, and this is the reason why they regard freedom of navigation through the canal as a matter of life and death to them.

What is the best way of interpreting and understanding the events of the last three months in the Middle East? We have to take, as our starting point, the existence of a conflict of interests between the British and the French on one side and the Arabs on the other in this area. All this is the land of the Arabs. They do not want British and French domination in any form. They want to be complete masters in their lands. This is an axiomatic truth about which there cannot be any argument or controversy. This is the essence of Arab nationalism as it is of nationalism in general. If the Arabs are to be complete masters of their lands, all traces and relics of British and French domination should be swept away. The existence of the Suez Canal Company is one relic of that domination. This Company was originally formed to work the Suez Canal in days when Egypt was a dependency. It was a Company in which the majority of shares was held by the British, the French, and other foreigners. It had a lease for 99 years expiring in 1968, and it was agreed that at its expiry control over the canal should automatically revert to Egypt. There was the international convention of 1888 under which the Company was required to allow free navigation in the canal for the ships of all nations.

What happened on July 26, this year, was Colonel Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal which is a water-way passing entirely over Egyptian territory and consequently subject to Egyptian, sovereignty. Nationalisation was the logical outcome of Egypt’s independence. Egypt had every legal right to do this, especially when Colonel Nasser made it clear that compensation would be paid to the shareholders. The British and the French did not accept this, though they said there was nothing illegal about it. They opposed nationalisation because they entertained a fear and suspicion that it would be followed by some kind of discrimination against their ships in the matter of tolls and in the provision of other facilities for navigation. Such a discrimination would result in their Middle East oil supplies being cut off.

Why did they entertain such fear and suspicion? It was primarily because they felt that Nasser was a dictator who was determined to bring all the Arab world under his control and that his success in such an enterprise would spell disaster to them. He openly pursued an anti-British and anti-French policy. Not merely this. According to their views he was becoming more and more pro-Soviet. He opposed the Baghdad Pact created by the British for the protection of their interests in the Middle East against Soviet aggression. He was getting arms supplies from Soviet Russia and the Communist States allied with her. He was thus, in co-operation with Soviet Russia, building a superior force for himself. If he becomes the leader of the Arab countries, there would surely be the risk of nationalisation of Middle East oil companies, which would spell British economic ruin. With him at the head of the Arabs, there would be obstruction to British communication with the Far East and with Australia and New Zealand. One should not forget that the Middle East is on the shortest route between Europe and the East, that it has a strategic importance as the meeting place of three continents, and that in the British view it would become a sphere of Soviet influence, the moment that they lose control over it. They were therefore afraid that the nationalisation of the Suez Canal was fraught with serious consequences for them, politically and economically.

The French suspected Colonel Nasser because, according to them, he was the force behind all the trouble they were having in their colonies in Northern Africa, especially in Algeria. So long as he was in power the trouble would continue. They therefore thought that it would be to their national interest to oust him from all authority in Egypt. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal is only a step taken by him to increase his prestige and influence in the Arab world and they opposed it as they were unwilling to see any increase in his prestige and influence.

The Suez Canal issue thus became a trial of strength between Nasser on one side and the British and French on the other. If it was only the freedom of navigation for the ships of all nations in the canal without any discrimination, Colonel Nasser was prepared to give all the assurances that these, along with the other, users of the canal wanted. He was prepared to stand by the international convention of 1888, suitably revised in the light of modern conditions. As suggested by India he was quite willing to the setting up of an International Advisory Body to help the Egyptian Government in running the canal. What he disliked was international control, which went quite contrary to the principle of Egyptian sovereignty over a national highway. Several conferences were held in London, after the canal was nationalised, to bring pressure on Nasser to accept international control. But he was not prepared to compromise on what he considered to be a fundamental principle of his country’s sovereignty.

From the very beginning, the British and the French were determined to bring him round by the use of force; and for this purpose, they moved their armies, navy and airplanes to Cyprus. Unfortunately for them, however, they were deterred from such a course by the United States. She was averse to any war against Egypt as it would surely develop into a third world war with nuclear weapons. She felt that it would be possible to get Nasser to agree to some arrangement under which freedom of navigation across the canal could be guaranteed. She also felt that it was time for her to tell her British and French allies plainly and clearly that she could not indefinitely support them in their colonial policies, as this was making her unpopular in the under-developed world of Asia and Africa. She realised the strength of Arab nationalism and the risk involved in using force to put it down. Any use of force in this connection would bring Soviet Russia into the Middle East, the one thing which the British, the French and all other members of the North Atlantic Alliance were determined to prevent.

During all these ten years of cold war, the British and the French were in close alliance with the United States. It was this unity of the West that gave strength to the Alliance. It is true that the Suez Canal issue was not the first occasion when acute differences arose between the United States and Britain. The British disliked the pressure which the United States brought on them at the time of the oil crisis in Iran and the pressure to evacuate the Suez Canal area in 1953. But it was now that the rift among the allies was open and clear. The British and the French became increasingly dissatisfied with the United States for the latter not having co-operated with them in their efforts to retain international control over the canal. They were therefore determined to act by themselves. And without consulting the United States, they issued an ultimatum to Egypt and invaded her territories at the head of large forces on the last day of October. They destroyed the air-bases of Egypt, her airplanes and much of the arms supplies she received from the Communist countries. They occupied a part of the canal zone. Thousands of Egyptians lost their lives. Their purpose was to depose Colonel Nasser, set up a puppet government over Egypt, and save for themselves, whatever power and influence they still had in the Middle East and Northern Africa.

All this was open and naked aggression.

The excuse put forward by the British and the French was, that they undertook that ‘police action’ to put a stop to a war between Israel and Egypt that had already been going on, a war which would affect the free navigation of the Suez Canal, the international lifeline, and establish peace in the Middle East, which was being threatened by the attempts of Israel and the Arab States to break the armistice terms imposed on them by the United Nations in 1949. No one, however, was deceived by these excuses. Even in Britain, large sections of the people condemned the actions of their government as amounting to open and naked aggression, which brought dishonour to the country, which threatened the disruption of the Commonwealth and the outbreak of a third world war, in which Britain would be the first victim of nuclear weapons.

At the root of the crisis in the Middle East is the State of Israel. This State is only eight years old. It was a State established in the face of the opposition of all Arabs. It was so established because Israel had superior force in 1948-49 when the Arab States opposed her and carried on warfare against her. There could be no answer to the question whether it was morally right for the Jews who left Israel two thousand years ago to return to Palestine on the ground that it was at one time their homeland, to drive away more than half a million Arabs to whom also Palestine was equally a homeland for two thousand years, and establish a State of their own. But the fact is that they returned, and because of their superior force, they established a State for themselves, and are determined to defend it under all circumstances. There is also equally the fact that the State of Israel has been recognised, on the very day of its establishment, by Soviet Russia, the United States and several other states, and that she is a member of the United Nations. With a population of less than two millions, she has been maintaining a standing army of about 75,000, with up-to-date weapons, and a reserve force of about 200,000. In the war of 1948-49, the United Nations intervened and brought about an armistice, which defined the boundaries of Israel. The U.N.O. has also an armistice commission on the spot, whose duty is to see that neither Israel nor the Arab States cross the armistice lines.

But what has been the actual course of events? The Arab States have not at all recognised Israel. They are in a state of war with her. It is a cardinal item in the policy of all of them to put an end to her. This has been proclaimed on a number of occasions by them, and Colonel Nasser is as much an adherent of this policy as any other Arab ruler. In spite of the armistice and the armistice line, and the presence of the armistice commission, there have been border clashes, especially between Israel and Jordan, and Israel and Egypt. The supplies of arms to Egypt by Communist countries, going on for the last one year, has strengthened her considerably from a military point of view. Israel was unable to get similar supplies from the United States, Britain and France. She was told that these three States had already entered into a pact under which they were obliged to defend the existing frontiers of Israel in case of aggression by Arab States and of the Arab States in case of aggression by Israel and that that pact of 1950 would maintain peace in the area.

The withdrawal of the British from the canal zone, and the growing supply of Soviet arms to Egypt, naturally alarmed Israel. To add to this, there was the military alliance between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Jordan which had been an ally of Britain, with a British contingent still stationed within her territory, was becoming more and more anti-British. The elections recently held in that kingdom brought into parliament an anti-British and pro-Communist majority. Israel felt that all this would bring Jordan also closer to Egypt, all the more because, most of the Arab refugees from Palestine were settled in Jordan. There was also in recent months a movement of Iraqi forces to Jordan borders. All this created alarm in the mind of Israel that the border clashes might ultimately develop into a full scale war when the Arab States accumulated superior force. According to Israel time was on the side of the Arabs.

Complaints made to the Security Council brought no real change. There was only a temporary easing of the tension, That was all.

Israel therefore became convinced that it would not be to her interest to keep quiet until the Arab States gathered superior force. She was determined to act. It is not clear whether she had any understanding with Britain and France. She crossed the armistice lines on October 28, and invaded Egyptian territory in large numbers. She occupied the Gaza strip, and a large part of the Sinai peninsula, advancing within a few miles of the Suez Canal, when the British and the French began their invasion. The aggression of Israel was as much open and naked as that of Britain and France, though she had some excuse, which the other countries had not.

The United States issued a warning to Israel when she heard of the orders of general mobilisation. But Israel paid no heed to such warning, because she knew that it would be a mere warning, unaccompanied by any throat of the use of force to give effect to the warning. When Britain and France began their invasion, the situation became more serious. The matter came before the Security Council, but no action could be taken by that body, as the two aggressors against Egypt were permanent members of the Council, and vetoed the Council’s attempts to pass any resolutions. An emergency meeting of the General Assembly was then called, as there was no provision for the big power veto in that body. Resolutions were passed by the Assembly with unprecedented majorities, calling on Britain, France and Israel to cease-fire and to withdraw their invading forces. Britain and France, who were determined on occupying the canal zone, and undermining the power and authority of Colonel Nasser, refused to accept the terms proposed by the Assembly, and suggested all sorts of conditions including the stationing of a U.N.O. force in the area, competent and strong enough to keep peace between Israel and the Arab States, and safeguard the free navigation on the canal. Parleys were going on between the U.N.O. on one side, and the British, the French and the Israelites on the other. These did not stop their military actions. Egyptian losses were growing heavy.

Then came the letter from Bulganin, the Soviet Prime Minister, to Sir Anthony Eden of Britain and Mollett of France, threatening that unless they gave up the aggression against Egypt, Soviet Russia would throw her rocket bombs against them, and thus put an end to their unjustified attacks on a weak country. This was something sudden and unexpected. Britain, France and Israel had superiority of force over Egypt. They could have conquered her because of such superiority. But there now appeared on the scene a power, far stronger and wielding a force, which these States could never resist by themselves; and when it became clear that the United States was unwilling to take up their cause, Eden, Mollett and Ben Gurian all climbed down, and said that, in conformity with the General Assembly’s resolution, they were prepared to order ceasefire, and they did so. We should not however be deceived into thinking that it was the resolution of the General Assembly that brought them round. They were really brought round by the threats of Soviet Russia, as these threats were based on her real superiority in the possession of force.

What exactly is the situation now? The General Assembly is sending a force of four thousand, contributed by a number of countries, the big powers not being among them, to Egypt to keep peace between Israel and that country. The British and the French state that they would withdraw their armies when a U.N.O. force, competent to keep peace, is stationed there. But there are other complications. They want the U.N.O. force to safeguard the free navigation of the canal, in addition to keeping peace between Israel and Egypt. But there are countries like India who are against the force being used to settle the canal issue. What would happen in case the British refuse to withdraw unless this condition also is satisfied? Will the U.N. force fight with them and with Israel armies? If a fight becomes necessary what can a miscellaneous contingent of 4000 do against the superior invading armies?

Behind all this is the threat of Soviet Russia that she would send volunteers to defend Egypt and the Middle East. China is prepared to do the same. Can the U.N.O. meet such a threat? Has it the necessary strength for it? There is of course the view expressed by President Eisenhower that the United States would not keep quiet in case such volunteers are sent. Everything is thus in a state of confusion. The Soviet has a definite policy. She is determined to establish her influence in the Middle East, taking advantage of the tension between the Arab countries and the West. She has superior force to accomplish her objective. The United States has as yet no definite policy. Without her co-operation, the U.N.O. can do nothing in the Middle East. It looks as if the Arab world will become a sphere of Soviet influence unless something extraordinary happens in the United States, to give a positive direction to her policy. Small States like Syria, Lebanon, and even Egypt cannot live independently in a world dominated by two big powers. They must be content with the role of being attached to one or other of them though the nature of this attachment may vary from one State to another. History supplies many examples of spheres of influence, of protectorates, of client States, etc.

The crisis in Eastern Europe is somewhat different from that in the Middle East. In the Middle East there is an attempt at fresh aggression. What happened in Eastern Europe is aggression and conquest by Soviet Russia ten years ago. Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Albania and Eastern Germany, with a population of hundred millions, were occupied by the Soviet armies in 1944-45. They set up in them puppet governments of their own. All these countries are actually colonial dependencies of Soviet Russia. Their economies have become subordinated to that of Moscow; and people in them suffer from all the evils of colonialism. Soviet oppression has become unbearable. The result is popular revolt. The Poles and the Hungarians are carrying on a struggle for national freedom and Soviet armies are being used to suppress it.

The Soviet government is justifying its action on the ground that its armies are being used to put an end to counter-revolutionary fascist movements, and that the armies are being sent there at the invitation of the local governments. This is however a most unconvincing argument. How can there be a counter-Revolutionary fascist movement, after ten years of successful Communist rule, liquidating all capitalist and land lord elements? Apart from this it is no concern of outsiders to intervene in a civil war in any State. The parties to the war must be allowed to fight it out among themselves and decide the issue. Did not Lenin, Trotsky and all the other revolutionary leaders condemn the allies when they sent armies in 1917-18 to put an end to the civil war in Soviet Russia?

Let us be clear that what is now happening in Eastern Europe is a struggle by the nations there to get rid of Soviet imperialism and not to establish Capitalism or Fascism. All these countries take Tito as the model for them to follow. Titoism has been of service to Yugoslavia and it can be equally of service to Poland, Hungary, Romania etc. There is still a party of Stalinists at Moscow, which is against all Titoism, and it is that party that is now asserting itself. This raises the question whether Stalinism is really dead. Each of these countries is determined to accept Communism. They do not want to go to Capitalism. Some of them like Hungary have also undertaken to adopt a policy, of not aligning themselves with the West, and remaining neutral, like Austria. In spite of all this the Stalinists in Soviet Russia are determined to use force for perpetuating their imperialistic control. In essence there is no distinction between British and French action in Egypt and Soviet action in Hungary and other countries of Eastern Europe. The only difference is that the Soviet superiority in the possession of force is winning victory in her empire, while its absence has compelled the British and the French to give up their aggression.

Nov. 17, 1956