International Affairs:

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

By Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIYA, M.A.

The passing away of Stalin, the architect of Soviet Russia, is the most outstanding event of the quarter. He was undoubtedly one of the greatest of men and exhibited throughout his life unrivalled powers of statesmanship. He was responsible for the stabilisation of the Communist regime in the country, with the result that even the worst opponents of Communism are now agreed in thinking that there is no chance whatever of bringing Soviet Russia into the fold of Western democracy. As the Secretary of the Communist Party he created a force of six to eight million men fanatically wedded to Marxism and prepared to work and even to die for it. There are no signs of rebellion in the country. People have become adjusted to the totalitarian form of government–an adjustment which has been easy because of the fact that despotism was the only form of government which they knew for hundreds of years before the establishment of Bolshevik rule, and that at no time did they enjoy the blessings of a free democratic government. When Lenin died in 1924 what happened was a struggle for power among the prominent leaders of the party. It was then that Stalin showed his great abilities. He got rid of all his rivals–including Trotsky–and established himself as the supreme ruler of the country. He took to systematic purges of the party from time to time and displayed no scruples whatever in putting an end to the lives of his opponents, irrespective of their past services to the cause of the October revolution. This was the first great service he rendered to his country–the stabilisation of the Communist regime.

Stalin is known as the author of successive five-year plans by which the economy of the country was revolutionised. Collective farms based on mechanisation became the rule. Industries of all sorts–heavy as well as light–were introduced. Power projects were undertaken. Transport was improved. The result was that an under-developed agricultural country was transformed into a most highly industrialised one within a short period; and by accomplishing this Stalin justified to a considerable extent the assumption of dictatorial authority.

It was however the triumphant victory which he won against the hordes of Hitler in the second World War that brought him immortal fame. This added immensely to his popularity and brought to him the unlimited confidence of the people in his leadership. This strengthened his ambition to become the founder of an extensive Soviet empire. And during the seven years of his life after the war, he succeeded in establishing Soviet suzerainty over many countries in Eastern and Central Europe. He helped the Communist party in China in the war which it waged against Chiang-Kai-Shek and had the satisfaction that the Communist empire got stretched from Western Germany to the Pacific Ocean. He had thus under his influence eight hundred millions of people and ruled over an empire of which his predecessors-the Czars of Russia–only dreamt. Today Soviet Russia is one of the two great powers that have a real claim to be regarded as world powers and this was the work of Stalin.

It is not merely as the builder of the internal strength of Soviet Russia and as a leader responsible for the expansion of the Soviet empire that Stalin left his impress on the history of his country, but also as one who perfected a new set of instruments and weapons in carrying on wars of conquest. It has been noticed by all observers that it was not so much by open aggression and war that Stalin brought Poland, Czechoslovakia and several other countries under his control. He accomplished this through encouraging the local Communist parties to rebel against their governments and seize power by force. It was this method that he adopted in Korea. The establishment therefore of Communist regimes in non-Communist countries is to be the outcome of civil war and of internal crisis. This is the instrument which received perfection at his hands. It is to this that we have to trace the existence in every country today of a Communist party looking for guidance and direction to Moscow and being more loyal to Moscow than to the country of which its members are citizens. Stalin also was responsible for perfecting the instruments of psychological warfare and warfare through propaganda. His greatness therefore lies not only in what he achieved during his lifetime but also in leaving to his successors a number of instruments effective in enabling them to continue his policies.

Among the last–though not the least important–of his achievements is the arrangement which he made during the last days of his life for peaceful succession to power after his death. He anticipated that if things were left unsettled there would be the same struggle for power after his death as there was after the death of Lenin, and that such a struggle would be far more dangerous in a world in which for nearly seven years a cold war had been going on between his country and the United States. So early as October 1952 it was clear that Malenkov would succeed Stalin as Premier. The result was that when he died, his mantle fell quite smoothly on Malenkov. It was as normal as Eisenhower succeeding President Truman and Queen Elizabeth succeeding George VI. The only difference that the outside world is made to see is that Malenkov is sharing power with a number of other prominent leaders of the party, and that what may be called a collective dictatorship of three to five persons has taken the place of a single dictator.

Everything goes to show that there is perfect understanding among those who are in authority in Russia today, that they are working together as a single team, and that no internal strains or stresses will affect the strength of the new regime. It is a great tribute to the work of Stalin that he has left behind him a strong and stable State, completely consolidated, a political party firmly welded together and prepared to defend the country and the government against all dangers, and a team of successors who have the confidence that they will get from their party and the people all the loyalty and support needed to enable them to work for what they regard as the best interests of their country.

All under-developed countries in the world–especially those which have recently become free–where people are not familiar with the working of democracy and where actual power is exercised by a single leader–whatever be the external features of the constitutional system–have a great lesson to learn from Stalin.

The policy announced by Eisenhower after he assumed office early this year indicated that war would become more intensified in Korea and that, with Formosa as the base, it might be extended into the mainland of China. The suspension of the Korean truce talks and the impasse on the question of the prisoners of war even after the Indian proposal was accepted by the General assembly, made the President feel that it was only through war that Soviet Russia and Communist China could be brought round to some kind of negotiated peace. But today the atmosphere is better. There is a feeling that the international situation has become less tense, that some kind of armistice will be possible in Korea, and that this might be followed by a conference of all interested powers for the settlement of all outstanding issues responsible for the tension in the international sphere.

It is the new regime in Soviet Russia that has kindled this hope of a peaceful solution of all outstanding issues. As soon as it came to office it announced that there were no problems which could not be settled by peaceful negotiation, that it was quite ready to enter into such a negotiation, and that it only waited for response from other countries. Along with this it announced a number of changes in the internal system of government which gave hope that it was prepared to modify some of the policies which characterised the Stalin regime. It not only released the doctors who were previously suspected of having been responsible for the death of one of the prominent leaders of the Communist party but also punished some of the leading men who were responsible for creating such a suspicion. Along with this there came some kind of general amnesty as a result of which several prisoners were released and the sentence on several others was reduced. Most of these were persons who were accused of not doing their work in factories or other establishments according to law. The amnesty did not, it is true, apply to those accused of political crimes and counter-revolutionary measures. They continued to remain in concentration camps. But the fact that several thousands of non-political prisoners got released was taken as an indication that the new regime was prepared to reverse the policies of Stalin and to adopt milder methods of administration leading to a relaxation of police methods and to some humanisation of the criminal law. The inference was drawn from all this that there were some men high up in the Communist party who were only waiting for Stalin’s death to bring about changes like these and that they might be quite ready to reverse his foreign policy also.

This was followed by two other announcements which had a direct bearing on Korean negotiations. They were to the effect that some arrangement might be made to exchange immediately till prisoners of war who were sick and wounded, and that negotiations might be reopened to consider the repatriation of the other prisoners of war, more or less on the lines indicated in the Indian resolution accepted by the General Assembly. These announcements were made from Peking. They indicated that there was some change of heart among those who were in authority in China. It was also felt that Mao and Chow-En-Lai were in Moscow after Stalin’s death, that they had consultations with Malenkov and Molotov, and that the announcements were the outcome of a change in Soviet policy also. In addition to this the Soviet Government agreed to enter into talks with Britain, the United States etc., on the protection to be afforded to allied aircraft flying near the Iron Curtain and subjected to Soviet shootings on charges of having illegally crossed into the Soviet area.

Negotiations therefore were resumed on the subject of the prisoners of war. The wounded and the sick were exchanged without much difficulty, but the question of the repatriation of the other prisoners of war could not be satisfactorily settled. The original Chinese proposal was that the prisoners unwilling to be repatriated were to be kept in the custody of a neutral State till their fate was finally decided. But debate arose as to who this neutral power should be, and as to whether the prisoners were to be physically removed from Korea into the territory of the neutral State or kept in Korea itself under the guard of the neutral State. In a way Pakistan was agreed to as the neutral State to take charge of the prisoners and it was also agreed that they need not be removed from Korea. But before the matter was finally settled fresh proposals have been made by the Chinese that, instead of a single State, a committee of four States with another as an Umpire should be set up to take charge of them. This was more or less on the lines of the Indian resolution of December last. It is however not known at the time of writing whether the new proposal would be accepted by the United States, as there are still some controversial points to be settled. One refers to the final disposal of those not willing to be repatriated; another to the forces that should be kept by the neutral States constituting the Committee to keep guard over the prisoners; and a third to the opportunity to be afforded to the governments of the States to which the prisoners belong as citizens, to send persons to the prisoners’ camps to persuade them to get repatriated. Among the neutral States proposed are Poland and ‘Czechoslovakia. The United States is unwilling to permit Polish and Czech forces inside Korea to keep guard over prisoners. All these would be matters for further negotiation. As the Chinese have shown indication of being ready for some armistice in Korea, it is hoped that an armistice will become an accomplished fact.

But there is a more important question. An armistice in Korea will be ofno use if it is not followed by negotiation for the settlement of all outstanding issues in the Far East as well as in Europe. It will be equally useless if the Communist forces begin fighting in some other part of Asia after stopping the war in Korea. It has therefore to be recognised that the matter at issue is not the Korean war, but the cold war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Are there any chances of this cold war coming to an end and normal relations established between the East and the West?

It is not possible to give an answer to this question. There are so many unknown factors in the situation that make it impossible to give an answer. For instance, while the Korean negotiations have been going on, there has also been a large-scale invasion of Laos–one of the three Associated States of Indo-China in the French Union–by the Communist Viet-Minh forces of Ho. The inference is being drawn from this that a Korean armistice may be followed by an intensification of warfare in Indo-China where the situation, from the point of view of the French, is highly precarious. If this inference is correct Eisenhower and his advisers may not be prepared to enter into any armistice in Korea, unless there is a guarantee that the Communists would cease to bring pressure on Indo-China, Malaya, Burma, Thailand and other countries of South Asia which are vulnerable to Communist attack.

As a matter of fact, in a historic speech which he delivered on April 16, 1953 Eisenhower laid down the preliminary conditions that Soviet Russia and China should satisfy even before a conference could be convened to settle the terms of peace between the two blocs. According to him the Soviet fulfillment of these conditions is the only true test of Soviet sincerity in desiring a negotiated peace. Not only should Communists cease to give help to the rebels in Indo-China, Malaya and Burma; they should co-operate in bringing about the unification of Korea and the establishment of a government based on free elections. Soviet Russia should also be prepared to give freedom to her satellites in Europe and promise to create conditions favourable for the conclusion of a treaty with Austria. Eisenhower also made references to disarmament and to international control of Atomic weapons.

The U.S.S.R. however is not prepared to give any preliminary guarantees before negotiations are opened. She has also taken objection to laying down any such conditions, as it is these very conditions that have to be discussed at the Conference. Moreover she has pointed out that Eisenhower made no reference whatever in his speech to the representation of China on the U.N.O., to the handing over of Formosa to the Chinese Government, and to the problem of Germany. The result is that each party is suspicious of the motives of the other party in launching what may be called the peace offensive, and, though both parties are anxious to avoid a global war, this want of mutual trust stands in the way of a quick settlement of the outstanding issues.

The opinion is now held however that there will be no war in 1954 as was expected hitherto. It was on the basis of this expectation that the States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation undertook their programme of re-armament. It is now felt that Soviet Russia might not undertake a war in 1954 and the programme therefore has been modified accordingly. Spending a little less on re-armament and a little more on the production of the commodities needed to maintain the normal standards of living of the people, have been agreed to at the last meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Council.

But there has been no perceptible change in the over-all policy of either bloc. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is still faced with the problem of creating an integrated European Army of which the contribution of Federal Germany would be an integral part. French suspicions of German revival have not been completely removed and the ratification of the European Defence Community treaties is being delayed in all the countries of Western Europe. Russia is proposing the withdrawal of all occupation armies from Germany and the creation of a United Germany, but the West is not prepared to pay heed to these proposals unless fair and free elections in East and West Germany are guaranteed. Meanwhile the United States has agreed to send increasing supplies to support the French in Indo-China, threatened now by the Communist invasion of Laos. If Laos falls, the next step will be for a Communist attack on Thailand and Burma. France is not prepared to co-operate with the United States in the defence of Western Europe, unless the United States is prepared to fight for French supremacy in her colonial empire in North Africa as well as in Indo-China. The result is that, though the United States speaks the old language of the freedom and self-determination of colonial peoples, she is not in a position to give effect to her old views in the face of the new dilemma created by Communist imperialism. The net result is that American supplies are poured into Indo-China to uphold French supremacy.

It looks therefore as if the cold war between the two blocs will have to go on for sometime longer before they begin to seriously think of a negotiated peace. America should realise peace in that Far East will be impossible unless the People’s Republic of China is admitted into the U.N.O. and gets Formosa. She should also realise that peace in South Asia would be impossible until the French grant real independence to Indo-China. The Chinese should equally realise that no settlement in the Far East would be possible until they give up their policy of subverting the legitimate governments in South Asia and givinghelp to Communist rebels.

But peace in the Far East is not possible unless the issues in Europe are also settled. At the heart of the European issues is the problem of Germany. The Germans are a nation of sixty millions. Their country has large and rich industrial resources. Russia is afraid of a united Germany entering the West European camp; the French are equally afraid of a re-armed Germany undertaking a Hitlerian war. It is these dilemmas with which the parties are faced. In an atmosphere surcharged, as the present atmosphere is, with mutual suspicion and distrust there does not seem to be any prospect of the issues being solved in the near future.

Human ingenuity seems to be too weak an instrument for the purpose. Time and Fate alone will be able to solve them.