Foreign Affairs

The position in Europe now appears to be even graver than it was last September. The aftermath of Munich has been a shattering disillusionment. The Cassandra-like prophecies of the Left have become pungently real. Even the Right in France and the Tories in England are revising their attitude to Hitler. They tried, with disastrous results, co-operation and partnership with him; they are now preparing to resist him with vigour. Appeasement has given place to warnings and mutual aid against the aggressor. The contending forces in Europe are massing for a terrible conflict.

For the consequences of Munich are being realised in full only now. It was a strange peace that accelerated the pace of rearmament, sold the pass to Germany in the east and unfolded a new European destiny. It encouraged Germany to launch upon her imperialist schemes in the Danubian basin. The traditional ambitions of Germany in expanding towards the Black Sea and beyond were made immediately possible. By the absorption of Austria, Germany obtained a common frontier with her partner, Italy, with Hungary, a vassal State, and Yugoslavia, a friendly power. By the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, she occupied a Central European bastion and commanded all the strategic positions leading to the east and west. She became the mistress of all communications in Central Europe by road, rail and river. From the Low Countries up the Rhine to the Swiss peaks, along the whole Alpine range to Vienna, round the entire mountain rim of what was once Czechoslovakia up to the Baltic and down the Alps, almost to within sight of the Adriatic, the Third Reich controls the valleys, the passes and the bridge-heads. Over the Bohemian, Moravian and Austrian mountains, the Reich has advanced, in less than a year, right into the Danubian basin, where the countries are pent up, devoid of natural defences and too weak, individually or collectively, to resist the wolf among their fold. German railways will now run almost right down to the frontiers of Yugoslavia and Rumania. The construction of the three projected waterways–the Rhine-Main-Danube system; the Elbe-Danube connexion; the Oder-March- Danube link-will both drain and feed all the countries between Germany and Russia as far down as the Aegean Sea and reduce them to a state of vassalage. German waves of expansion will beat upon the Balkan region and pass on to the other shores of the Black Sea. The Danube, the king of the European rivers, as Napoleon called it, will flow brown with the tide of Nazi imperialism.

But no German offensive could unroll against an "undeveloped Eastern Europe" till Germany has made sure of her rear and flanks. In 1936 she closed the Rhineland portals in the face of France; in 1937 she extricated Mussolini from a helpless position and formed the Rome-Berlin Axis; in March 1938 she absorbed Austria; in September occupied Bohemia; and in March this year absorbed Moravia and retained a strip of territory, Carpatho-Russ, as an independent State opening the -door into Rumania. Germany is thus secure on her western and southern borders; but her eastern flank is still to be covered. In September 1938, Poland took advantage of the crisis and occupied Teschen-Bohumin, the most important railway junction, which commands the entrance into the Moravian gap. Till Poland has been levered out of this strategic position, German advance will not be secure against attack.

Moreover, Poland forms an enormous salient on Germany’s eastern frontiers. The Polish Corridor cuts German territory into two and the Polish port of Gdynia is increasing in importance. Finally, the Nazis came to power promising the recovery of the Corridor, and they will not rest till they have "fulfilled their pledges." Memel was wrested from Lithuania; Danzig has gone Nazi; now the Corridor must be got from Poland.

So Poland has become the chief danger-zone in Europe now. The furious Press campaign of the Nazis is being directed against the Poles. Nazi troops are being massed on the Polish frontier; and a nervous Europe is watching the staging of yet another Nazi coup.

How is Poland bracing herself up for the attack? Poland has always been the Sphinx of Europe; her policy is one of deliberate vacillation, apparently riddled with contradictions. She has formed a military pact with France; her defences have been built with French money and French military missions. She has entered into an understanding with Soviet Russia and striven to lead a combination of smaller Powers against Germany from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Lastly, she has signed a pact of non-aggression with Germany. Her one aim is to preserve her territorial integrity and turn Germany’s attention away from her frontiers. She thus became a sinister accomplice to the hacking up of the Czech Republic. At the same time she seized the invaluable network of railways at Bohumin and threatened the German march into the Moravian gateway.

On the other hand, Poland’s internal situation is such that she would go a long way to accommodate Hitler. Her regime–the Government of the Colonels–is ninety per cent totalitarian. Historically and politically the Colonels have a horror of Russia and would avoid any truck with her. But in the event of a war with Germany, Russian military help would be indispensable Moscow would have to rush to the rescue before Paris could think of reinforcements. And that would mean the presence of Russian troops on Polish soil, a state which the Polish Government view with horror. Thus, Poland has been straining every nerve to be in the victorious camp on whatever side. Col. Beck, one of the astutest diplomats in Europe, is a friend of Hitler because Hitler triumphs every time. He is a friend of Mussolini because Mussolini might act as a brake on the Axis. But Col. Beck is Fascist in domestic politics, and he needs diplomatic victories abroad to buttress his position at home. To the furious onslaught of Hitler and his denunciation of the Polish-German Pact, Beck has answered with firmness but left the door ajar for negotiations. He is well aware that the Polish Corridor encircled on three sides by German territory is at the mercy of the Third Reich, and that Gdynia could be isolated and Polish communications with the Baltic snapped beyond hope. He is not convinced about the assurances and guarantees of England and France; and he wishes to do without Soviet aid. So he may give up the Corridor in return for some concessions elsewhere–colonies or a strip on the Black Sea. Poland may thus become a Partner of Germany, an offshoot of the Rome-Berlin Axis; or she may raise the first barricade against Hitler. In the latter event, she would have to bring together France and Russia and England in a Grand Alliance against German hegemony. The final attitude of Poland therefore depends as much on her internal position as on the outcome of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations.

But Poland is by no means the only inflammable spot in Europe. Rumania is very much in the news. Her wheat and oil have been the dream of German imperialists. Dr. Schacht and Dr. Funk have made several economic bargains with Rumania; while the Dresdner Bank has been permeating Rumanian finance with German capital. And since last September Germany has acquired in Carpatho-Russ a jumping-off board into Rumania.

But there are complications. King Carol is a German but a very shrewd and jealous upholder of his territorial rights. He detests Russia but has allowed her to build the Dreiper bridge-head and the Bukovina railway which connects the Rumanian western frontier with Russia. Moreover, he knows how to scotch rebellious movements. He exposed the shallowness of Nazi influence by making M. Goga the head of an abortive ministry; he suppressed the Iron Guard. the local Nazi organisation, and had its leader eliminated. Finally, he has a Jewish mistress, who is hardly seen but who wields the greatest influence in Rumania.

Besides Rumania, the other Balkan countries also have taken great alarm at the results of Munich. Turkey and Greece are anxious to reinforce the Balkan Entente. In Yugoslavia the Stoyadonovitch Government, which was friendly to the Dictators, fell and gave place to M. Markovitch who appears to show a bolder front. But the Entente is by no means definite. In Greece, General Metaxas is an ardent Nazi; in Bulgaria Nazi influence is on the increase. Yugoslavia is torn by jealousies between the Serbs and Croats. And in all the Balkan countries the minorities problem presents a potential case for the intervention of Germany.

But Germany cannot hope to push into Danubia till she is certain about the attitude of Italy. The Rome-Berlin Axis was a diplomatic necessity to Italy, but once it was formed Germany gained the upper hand. She kept Italy embroiled with France while she steadily moved south and east of the Rhine. With the disappearance of Austria, Mussolini went into the ground and became the shadow of a shade. The Axis was unpopular in Italy, among the royal circle as well as the common people. Mussolini himself was in two minds about it. But Ciano’s enthusiasm, the vital need of German aid in Spain, and the German presence on the Brenner made it impossible for Italy to break away from the Axis. She was reduced to the position of a junior partner, a tool in the hands of Germany, diverting the attention of the democracies elsewhere while Germany attacked the independence of yet another Central European State. Moreover, for good or ill, Italy and Germany have to make common cause. Germany has contempt for the Latin country; Italy fears the excesses of the Teutonic State. But the similarity of the social system is such that the defeat of one country would almost inevitably lead to a social revolution in the other. Mussolini hates the Nazi system but he hates social democracy more. He is being ousted from the Balkan region by Hitler; but he cannot make friends with France and England because his ambitions conflict with their interests. The Duce would like to sit on the fence and grab without smashing. But he can no longer do so. Gone are the days when he could hunt with the hound and run with the hare. The German divisions on the Brenner and the German threat to Trieste compel subservience to the Nazi foreign office.

Thus, it is in this light that the occupation of Albania should be viewed. That strip of ragged and poverty-stricken country was in effect a protectorate of Italy. Its only value lay in its strategic position; it controls the gates of the Adriatic and the export trade of Yugoslavia. The occupation of Albania meant therefore the gain to the Axis Powers of yet another point of vantage in the Mediterranean. Albania, in itself useless to Italy, is of great importance to Germany in her Balkan adventures; while to Italy with Franco’s Spain and Pantellaria and the Dodecenese, it would secure the mastery of the Mediterranean.

How will the democracies meet this challenge? Will they position to resist? They have lost their foothold in Central Europe and are losing it in the Mediterranean. With Germany commanding the resources of Czechoslovakia and Austria, and with Italy threatening French communications with Morocco and Syria, can the democracies hope to cry halt to the Dictators? Another Munich would mean irreparable disaster. Piling up armaments without taking the initiative would only postpone the conflict. Unless the smaller powers which are looking for leadership are rallied to the cause of peace and security, the situation would deteriorate beyond hope.

Both in England and France some attempt is being made to put up a stiffer front. Munich, whatever else it did, brought a breathing space which has been exploited to advantage by the democracies, although the military preparations are far from complete. In England, the Government underwent a genuine conversion, and Lord Halifax at any rate is credited with the idea of resisting Hitler and preventing a second Munich. Mr. Chamberlain made a great speech at Birmingham and in Parliament announced a British guarantee of the Polish frontier. In France the differences between the Radicals and Socialists have gone into the ground in face of the European crisis, while the financial position has improved considerably under the ministry of M. Reynand. It is realised in France that on no account should Hitler be given another bloodless victory in Central Europe.

More than this, President Roosevelt has spoken in unmistakable terms about the attitude of America. In a war with the west, Germany and Italy will have to reckon with the might and men of the U. S. A.

The attitude towards Hitler is thus stiffening up; but will it take tangible shape? Russian co-operation is vital. Poland knows it; Rumania knows it; the democracies are reluctantly recognising it. Whatever the ideological differences, strategic and military factors compel France and England to act with Russia. Russia was left out in the cold at Munich; but Rumania hastened the construction of a Corridor for the passage of Soviet troops and double-tracked the Bukovina railway. If Hitler is to be restrained, a Grand Alliance should be formed between England, France, Russia and the smaller powers. Mr. Chamberlain himself was reluctantly forced to open negotiations with the Soviet.

But it is doubtful whether a Government headed by Mr. Chamberlain would genuinely form an alliance with Russia. His whole policy has been one of co-operation with the Dictators. He hates war and social revolution and has striven for a Four-Power pact between France, England, Germany and Italy. He calculates that Hitler would turn eastwards and come to a head-on collision with Russia and that England would be left well alone. So he sacrificed Austria, the Czech Republic and consistently co-operated with Mussolini. His calculations appear to be partly correct. But with the fall of each bastion in Central Europe and the Mediterranean, resistance to the Dictators becomes increasingly difficult. For Hitler has spoken not only of an advance towards the east but also of a final reckoning with France. Moreover, German imperialism might skirt Russia and impinge on British interests in the Near East. The Berlin-Baghdad line is a dangerous line of expansion. It precipitated the war of 1914; it would cause the outbreak of another, more terrible war, if the defences are down in the Balkans. So that even Mr. Chamberlain is forced to recognise the limits of appeasement. On the other hand, he hopes yet to continue to be a friend of Hitler and safeguard his own interests. Which means that he would not be persuaded to enter into a comprehensive system of collective security with Russia. So long as Mr. Chamberlain remains in power, a real Anglo-Soviet alliance would remain perhaps a distant possibility.

But even if definite, a mere stiffening up against Germany would not be enough. Alliances and understandings are the methods of power politics, and they serve to postpone, not prevent, the conflict. If the present respite is to be turned to good account a diplomatic and economic drive should be started to revivify the League and reconstruct a system of collective security. The great advantage of Germany lies in her geographical and economic position. The Balkan States are mostly agricultural countries which depend on their exports to Germany; a situation which has resulted in the former becoming subservient, politically and economically, to the latter. Thus, if the Western democracies genuinely desire to take the initiative, they should solve the economic problems of Danubia. They should underline the call of Roosevelt for an international conference, and make a major attempt to ensure peace. But so far nothing has beep done. Complicated motives in the minds of the democratic rulers are leading only to a drift away from peace, to an inevitable conflict. In the event of comprehensive and immediate action not being taken by the Western Powers in conjunction with Russia and America, it will soon be a question of time when the outbreak will occur.