Verse 3.1.73-74

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of verse 3.1.73-74:

कश्चिदेव गुणो द्रव्ये यथा सामर्थ्यलक्षणः ।
आधारोऽपि गुणस्यैवं प्राप्तः सामर्थ्यलक्षणः ॥ ७३ ॥
तयोस्तु पृथगर्थित्वे संबंधो यः प्रतीयते ।
न तस्मिन्नुपघातोऽस्ति कल्प्यमन्मन्न चाश्रुतम् ॥ ७४ ॥

kaścideva guṇo dravye yathā sāmarthyalakṣaṇaḥ |
ādhāro'pi guṇasyaivaṃ prāptaḥ sāmarthyalakṣaṇaḥ || 73 ||
tayostu pṛthagarthitve saṃbaṃdho yaḥ pratīyate |
na tasminnupaghāto'sti kalpyamanmanna cāśrutam || 74 ||

73. Because of their mutual indispensibility a particular quality is associated with a substance. Similarly, a substratum is also invariably associated with a quality.

74. When, because of this mutual indispensibility, a relation between the two is understood, it should not be abandoned nor something not actually mentioned be brought in.

Commentary

[Substance and quality require each other. This mutual requirement is called sāmarthya. Granting this mutual dependence, when a relation between them is understood from the very words of the sentence, it cannot be abandoned. All this about substance and quality is being said from the point of view of artificial abstraction (apoddhāra). In reality, the sentence is one and its meaning is an indivisible complex whole. Therefore, there cannot be any question of bringing in the meaning of a word which has not been mentioned in the sentence. As there is a mutual indispensibility between substance and quality, if both are expressed by separate verbal elements in the same sentence, they must be connected with each other. There is no justification to abandon this connection and connect any of the two with something not mentioned in the same sentence. A cognition which arises without any hitch must be taken as authoritative. The sentence is indivisible and conveys a single particularised meaning. For the sake of convenience in explanation it is divided artificially into parts and each part is assigned a meaning which is a universal. In association with the meanings of other words in the sentence, it becomes particularised. But this way of looking as it is only for the sake of convenience.

Really speaking, the meaning of the individual word continues to be a universal and only appears to be particularised in association with the meanings of other words. The word expressive of the universal disappears, as soon as it has been uttered, with its universal meaning and so with which particular is it to be identified? The speaker cannot mean to express both the universal and the particular at the same time. Besides, the other words also express universals and, so, with which particular is each universal to be identified? Therefore the right view is that the individual sentence conveys a particularised meaning. So there is no question of bringing in an idea not openly expressed in tire sentence].

It is now pointed out that, even when two relations come out in the same sentence, there need be no vākyabheda, splitting of the sentence, because of the two relations. One can be the main thing and the other secondary.