Verse 1.34

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of verse 1.34:

यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।
अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ॥ ३४ ॥

yatnenānumito'pyarthaḥ kuśalairanumātṛbhiḥ |
abhiyuktatarairanyairanyathaivopapādyate || 34 ||

34. Whatever is inferred with great effort by clever reasoners is explained otherwise by cleverer ones.¹

Commentary

Substance is different from quality because the latter qualifies the former. It is like this. Even though there would be the difference of qualifier and qualified in both cases, the word ‘king’ can qualify the word ‘kingdom’ (as in the phrase ‘the king’s kingdom’ = rājño rāṣṭram) but not the word ‘hermit’. The word sandal can qualify the word ‘smell’, but not the word colour. Therefore, substance is different from quality. Even though the separate identity of substance is thus established, it has been said that the argument is not sound. The fact is that words sometimes convey the general and sometimes the particular. To qualify the word smell or the like with the word sandal which stands for something having a particular colour, shape etc., has a purpose. To qualify it with the mere word colour would be useless, because colour is a general word and as much as it conveys was already known. When the question ‘whose man is this’ is asked the answer ‘the king’s’ is given in order to exclude other possible masters. Nobody would answer ‘of some person’, because that much was already known. Others give another example: Even though a word and a stanza have this much in common that both are parts of a hymn (which is a collection of words), a stanza can qualify a word (as in the expression ‘the word of a stanza’ = ṛcaḥ padam) but not vice-veṛsa (one would not say: the stanza of the word). Another argues differently: It is on the assumption of identity that the word sandal qualifies the word smell and the word colour does not. So the reason given: ‘because the latter qualifies the former’ to prove difference (between substance and quality) should prove the opposite. The problem arises because of particular meanings which figure or do not figure in the mind when words are uttered. Therefore, the inference of something which is invisible from what is visible is alright if it is not opposed to tradition. It is a fact that minor acts, closely connected with particular major acts like cooking and ordinarily leading to their inference, may be performed by some for deceiving others.²

Notes

1. Cf. Tathā hi kaiścid abhiyuktair yainenotpreksitāstarkā abhiyuktāntarairanyairābhāsyamānā dṛśyante—Śaṅk. Bhā. on Bṛ. Sū II.1.11.

2. The purpose of this kārikā is to show that reasoning, unsupported by tradition, is unreliable and that the reasoning of one may be upset by another. The argument of the Naiyāyika to prove that substance is different from quality is taken as an example. His argument, briefly, is: Substance is different from quality because the latter can qualify the former. Against this, others point out that the argument is weak because both what is different and what is not different from another can qualify it in some cases and cannot qualify it in other cases. A king and a kingdom are different from each other and we can say: the king’s kingdom (rājño rāṣṭram). Here ‘king’ qualifies ‘kingdom’. But, on this analogy, we cannot say: the hermit’s kingdom, even though the hermit and the kingdom are also different from each other. Similarly, we can say ‘the smell of sandal’, but we cannot say ‘the smell of something having colour’, even though in both cases, there is difference between the two things. To come to cases where there is no difference, we can say: āmrāṇāṃ vanam = a grove of mangotrees. Here mango-trees qualify grove, though the grove is not different from the trees. That which qualifies must keep out something. When we say, the smell of sandal, the word sandal keeps out other things having smell like flowers. When we say, the king’s man, the word ‘king’s’ keeps out other possible masters. It is not, therefore, the fact of being different which enables qualifiers to qualify a substance. Sometimes, the whole qualifies a part as in ‘ṛcaḥ padam’ = the word of a stanza or gṛhasya dvāraśālā = the parlour of the house. Here the house qualifies the parlour, because parlour is part of the house. In other words, the relation of qualifier and qualified cannot prove that two things are different from each other.