The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3541-3543 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3541-3543.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ज्ञायते हि स्थिरात्माऽन्यैः शुद्धस्फटिकसन्निभः ।
स च तेषां विपर्यासो नित्यात्मप्रतिषेधनात् ॥ ३५४१ ॥
आत्मग्राहि च विज्ञानमात्मनो यदि जायते ।
ततः सर्वात्मविज्ञानं युगपत्सम्प्रसज्यते ॥ ३५४२ ॥
अथ तस्मान्न जायेत नित्यं वाऽभ्युपगम्यते ।
तदा तद्विषयं न स्यात्पुरुषान्तरचित्तवत् ॥ ३५४३ ॥

jñāyate hi sthirātmā'nyaiḥ śuddhasphaṭikasannibhaḥ |
sa ca teṣāṃ viparyāso nityātmapratiṣedhanāt || 3541 ||
ātmagrāhi ca vijñānamātmano yadi jāyate |
tataḥ sarvātmavijñānaṃ yugapatsamprasajyate || 3542 ||
atha tasmānna jāyeta nityaṃ vā'bhyupagamyate |
tadā tadviṣayaṃ na syātpuruṣāntaracittavat || 3543 ||

Other people recognise the ‘soul’ as something permanent, resembling the pure rock-crystal; this idea of these people is clearly wrong, as the existence of the permanent ‘soul’ has been rejected. If the cognition envisaging the soul proceeds from one’s own soul, then there should be the cognition of all souls at one and the same time.—If it does not proceed from one’s own soul,—or if it is regarded as eternal,—then it could not envisage the soul at all:—being, in this respect like the cognitions of other persons.—(3541-3543)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Other people’—Keśava and others.

Under the Chapter on the ‘Soul’, the existence of the Soul has been rejected: any Cognition of it must be wrong and hence impure.

Further, the knowledge of these people relating to the eternal Soul that is spoken of,—does this knowledge or Cognition proceed from the person’s own Soul or not? These are the only two alternatives possible. In the former case, all his Cognitions should appear simultaneously, as their efficient cause would be there.—In the latter case, is the Cognition eternal or not-eternal? In both cases, that Soul would only be a replica of his own Soul, and hence, like the Cognition of other people, it could not envisage that Soul.—(3541-3543)

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