Verse 3544-3546

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ग्राह्यलक्षणवैधुर्याद्विस्तरेण च साधितात् ।
नैतदेव हि तज्ज्ञानं यद्वियदि शुद्धात्मदर्शनम् ॥ ३५४४ ॥
अथापि ज्ञानरूपत्वमात्मनोऽभ्युपगम्यते ।
दृश्यदर्शननानात्वभावान्नैवमपि ग्रहः ॥ ३५४५ ॥
स्वयम्प्रकाशरूपत्वं तज्ज्ञानस्येष्यते यदि ।
स्वसंवित्तिस्तदा प्राप्ता प्रत्यक्षा च मतिर्भवेत् ॥ ३५४६ ॥

grāhyalakṣaṇavaidhuryādvistareṇa ca sādhitāt |
naitadeva hi tajjñānaṃ yadviyadi śuddhātmadarśanam || 3544 ||
athāpi jñānarūpatvamātmano'bhyupagamyate |
dṛśyadarśananānātvabhāvānnaivamapi grahaḥ || 3545 ||
svayamprakāśarūpatvaṃ tajjñānasyeṣyate yadi |
svasaṃvittistadā prāptā pratyakṣā ca matirbhavet || 3546 ||

His knowledge does not consist in the direct perception of his pure self; because that is devoid of the characteristics of the ‘cognisable’, as has been proved in detail.—If the soul (self) is held to be of the nature of cognition (consciousness),—there can be no apprehension of it as such; because of the difference between the ‘seen’ and the ‘seeing’,—if then the said cognition is held to be self-illumined, then it comes to be ‘self-cognition’, and as such it would mean that the cognition is amenable to direct perception.—(3544-3546)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued under Text 3207, that—“His knowledge consists in the direct perception of His pure Self, and when the source of that knowledge is not pure, the knowledge itself is called Ignorance”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3544-3546 above]

If the Soul is held to be unconscious in its essence, then the Cognition that apprehends it must be regarded as impure; as it has been proved under the chapter on the ‘External World’ that by their very nature, all Cognitions are devoid of the apprehended and the apprehended

If, on the other hand, the Soul is held to be of the nature of Consciousness itself, then there would be non-difference between what is seen (cognised, i.e. the soul) and the seeing (Cognition, Consciousness); so that they could not be related to each other as the apprehended and the apprehender; which would mean that the Cognition could not be regarded as apprehending the Soul. Because it is only when there is some difference between the subject and the object that they can bear to each other the relation of the apprehender and the apprehended.

If, lastly, the idea is that, being luminous, like the lamp, the Cognition apprehends and envisages itself,—then there would be ‘self-Cognition’, which you do not admit; and it would set aside your idea that Cognition cannot be perceived. This is what is shown by the words—It would mean that Cognition is amenable to direct Perception’.—(3544-3546)