The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3530-3531 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3530-3531.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

गौणत्वेनैव वक्तव्यः सोऽपि मन्त्रार्थवादवत्वादवित् ।
इत्ययं नियमः सिध्येत्सर्वज्ञे तु निराकृते ॥ ३५३० ॥
पूर्वोक्तबाधकायोगे साधिते तु सविस्तरम् ।
संदिग्धो गौणनियमो मुख्यार्थस्यापि सम्भवात् ॥ ३५३१ ॥

gauṇatvenaiva vaktavyaḥ so'pi mantrārthavādavatvādavit |
ityayaṃ niyamaḥ sidhyetsarvajñe tu nirākṛte || 3530 ||
pūrvoktabādhakāyoge sādhite tu savistaram |
saṃdigdho gauṇaniyamo mukhyārthasyāpi sambhavāt || 3531 ||

That the descriptions should be understood in the figurative sense, like the mantra and Arthavāda texts,—would be right only after the actual existence of the omniscient person had been rejected.—As a matter of fact however, there is nothing to annul the idea of such a person; while, on the contrary, his existence has been actually proved in great detail. So that the idea of all this being figurative must remain doubtful: inasmuch as it is possible for it to be true in its primary sense.—(3530-3531)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued under Text 3200 that—“The descriptions that are met with of Omniscient Persons in the Purāṇas, etc. should be understood in the figurative sense”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3530-3531 above]

If the existence of the Omniscient Person had been rejected by proofs, then no other explanation being possible, the assertions in question might be taken in their figurative sense;—not otherwise, if the primary meaning were in any way possible. It cannot be right to regard the eternal Word to be mere Arthavāda; because an assertion is taken as an Arthavāda only when some other meaning is intended; in a case therefore where there is no such intention, there being no speaker desiring to make the assertion,—that condition cannot be fulfilled.—(3530-3531)

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