Verse 3459-3461

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

योऽश्रुतानुमितं सत्यं तत्परोऽर्थं प्रकाशते ।
प्रत्यक्षज्ञाततद्रूपः स तादृक्प्रतिपादकः ॥ ३४५९ ॥
प्रत्यक्षदृष्टनीरादिर्यथाऽन्यः प्रतिपादकः ।
अश्रुतानुमितं सत्यं तत्परखार्थमुक्तवान् ॥ ३४६० ॥
अतीन्द्रियं पराज्ञातसामर्थ्यं परिनिश्चयात् ।
मुद्रामण्डलकल्पादि लक्षणं मुनिसत्तमः ॥ ३४६१ ॥

yo'śrutānumitaṃ satyaṃ tatparo'rthaṃ prakāśate |
pratyakṣajñātatadrūpaḥ sa tādṛkpratipādakaḥ || 3459 ||
pratyakṣadṛṣṭanīrādiryathā'nyaḥ pratipādakaḥ |
aśrutānumitaṃ satyaṃ tatparakhārthamuktavān || 3460 ||
atīndriyaṃ parājñātasāmarthyaṃ pariniścayāt |
mudrāmaṇḍalakalpādi lakṣaṇaṃ munisattamaḥ || 3461 ||

When a person who, intent upon the truth, which is neither heard of nor inferred, expounds it,—such an expounder must be regarded as one who has had direct knowledge of that truth; for example, when the man who has actually seen water, points it out to others;—the great sage, intent upon the truth, has actually expounded, with firm conviction, the truth which had never been heard of or inferred,—which is beyond the reach of the senses, the potencies of which, like those of gestures, magic circles and the like, are not known to others.—(3459-3461)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—“It might have been established in a general way; but even so, what you wished to prove was the fact that Buddha had the knowledge of Dharma; how is that proved”?

In answer to this, the Author proceeds to show that the Blessed Lord did possess the knowledge of Dharma:—[see verses 3459-3461 above]

The argument may be thus formulated:—One who, intent upon the Truth, teaches the truth regarding unheard of and un-inferred things, he must be regarded as being directly cognisant of the real essence of those things,—e.g. the man who, having actually seen water, points it out to others;—the Blessed Lord has actually taught such Truths;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The truthfulness of the Teachings having been already established, the Reason cannot be said to be ‘Inadmissible’,—Nor is it ‘Inconclusive’—as has been shown already.—And as all our Reasons are present wherever the Probandum is present, the Reason cannot be regarded as ‘Contradictory’.

‘Parājñāta, etc.’—The Gesture, etc. whose potency is not known to other people.—(3459-3461)