The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3394-3396 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3394-3396.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यज्जातीयैः प्रमाणैस्तु यज्जातीयार्थदर्शनम् ।
भवेदिदानीं लोकस्य तथा कालान्तरेऽप्यभूत् ॥ ३३९४ ॥
इदानीमपि लोकस्य शक्तिर्ज्ञातुं न शक्यते ।
भवता जन्तुमात्रेण सर्वशक्त्यविनिश्चयात् ॥ ३३९५ ॥
निःशेषसत्त्वशक्तीनां ज्ञाने सर्वज्ञता बत ।
नचानुमानतः सिद्धिरन्यथाभावशङ्क्या ॥ ३३९६ ॥

yajjātīyaiḥ pramāṇaistu yajjātīyārthadarśanam |
bhavedidānīṃ lokasya tathā kālāntare'pyabhūt || 3394 ||
idānīmapi lokasya śaktirjñātuṃ na śakyate |
bhavatā jantumātreṇa sarvaśaktyaviniścayāt || 3395 ||
niḥśeṣasattvaśaktīnāṃ jñāne sarvajñatā bata |
nacānumānataḥ siddhiranyathābhāvaśaṅkyā || 3396 ||

[Such an assertion as that]—“The perception of certain things through certain causes in the past was exactly as it is found at the present time”.—As a matter of fact, even at the present time, it cannot be known what the capacity of people is, by you, who are a mere animal devoid of the definite knowledge of the capacity of all things. In fact, if you had the knowledge of the capacity of all things, omniscience would indeed be yours!—nor can it be known by means of inference, as there would always be a suspicion regarding its being otherwise.—(3394-3396)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—“When we say that this should have been the same in the past, we do not say so on the basis of what we have actually seen, but on the basis of Inference; the inference being in the form—‘The means of cognition that is found to apprehend certain things now must have done the same in the past, because it is a Means of Cognition

The answer to this is—‘Nor can it be known by Inference’;—as in the case of the Āmalakī just cited, peculiar effects are found to be brought about by peculiar causes; hence it might be possible that, through some cause, the Means of Cognition apprehends a different kind of things. Hence the Reason adduced would be ‘Inconclusive’.—(3394-3396)

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