Verse 3303-3306

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

स हि सन्नपि नेक्ष्येत जडैरन्यविकल्पवत् ।
साक्षादयोगुडाङ्गारा(र?)वह्विवन्न च कार्यकृत् ॥ ३३०३ ॥
तत्कार्यं वा यदाऽदृश्यमन्यकल्पजरागवत् ।
कार्ये दृश्येऽपि वा तेन नान्वयोऽस्य प्रतीयते ॥ ३३०४ ॥
सर्वार्थज्ञो यतोऽदृश्यः सदैव जडधीदृशाम् ।
नातोऽनुमानतस्तस्य सत्ता सिद्धिं प्रयास्यति ॥ ३३०५ ॥
अहेत्वव्यापकं चोक्तं प्रमाणं वस्तुनोऽस्य च ।
निवृत्तावस्य भावोऽपि दृष्टस्तेनापि संशयः ॥ ३३०६ ॥

sa hi sannapi nekṣyeta jaḍairanyavikalpavat |
sākṣādayoguḍāṅgārā(ra?)vahvivanna ca kāryakṛt || 3303 ||
tatkāryaṃ vā yadā'dṛśyamanyakalpajarāgavat |
kārye dṛśye'pi vā tena nānvayo'sya pratīyate || 3304 ||
sarvārthajño yato'dṛśyaḥ sadaiva jaḍadhīdṛśām |
nāto'numānatastasya sattā siddhiṃ prayāsyati || 3305 ||
ahetvavyāpakaṃ coktaṃ pramāṇaṃ vastuno'sya ca |
nivṛttāvasya bhāvo'pi dṛṣṭastenāpi saṃśayaḥ || 3306 ||

Though existent, he would not be seen directly by dull-witted persons; just like the conceptions of other people. Nor is he constantly active, just as the fire in the iron-ball is not active. Even when there, his activity would not be perceptible, like the feeling of love arising in others out of their fancies. Even if his activity would be perceptible, his connection with such action would not be cognised because the person knowing all things is always imperceptible for people whose eye of cognition is dull. It is for this reason that his existence cannot be proved by means of inference. It has been already explained that there can be no ‘cause’ or ‘pervader’ in his case. And yet it has been seen that even when the inference of the thing is not possible, the thing does exist. Thus it is that the matter (of the non-existence of the omniscient person) remains in doubt.—(3303-3306)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—“If the Omniscient Person exists, why is He not seen by any one at any time? If the view is that He can never be cognisable by men of limited vision,—even so, why is it that no action of His is ever perceived by any one? Even though the Visual Organ itself is not perceptible, its action, in the shape of the visual perception, is not necessarily inapprehensible”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3303-3306 above]

‘Sākṣāt’, ‘Directly’, Is to be construed with ‘Nekṣyeta’, ‘would not be seen’.

As a matter of fact, there is nothing that must be cognised once,—on the basis of which it could be argued that “because there is no Cognition of the Omniscient Person, He cannot exist”;—because the conception of one man, though existent, is not cognised by other men. Nor is it necessary that causes should always be bringing about their effects,—on the ground whereof it could be argued that—“as the action of the Omniscient Person is not perceptible, He cannot exist”; because it is found that even when the Fire in the Red Hot Iron has not begun to produce Smoke, it is still seen there.

Granting (for the sake of argument) that Causes are constantly active in bringing about their Effects; even so, there can be no certainty regarding the absence of those Effects; because all the Effects that are produced are not always perceived; and it is only if it were so, that the non-perception of the Effect could prove the non-existence of the Cause; because, even when produced, the Effect is not always perceived;—‘as in the case of the Love proceeding from fancies, in other men’; in the case of another person, it is found that though Love has been produced in his mind by fancies regarding the agreeable character of things,—such Love is not perceived by other men; and yet it is not regarded as non-existent.

Or, even in cases where the effect is perceived, if its cause is something imperceptible,—and the observer is unable to perceive its affirmative and negative concomitances,—no inference of that cause is possible. Similarly even when the Omniscient Person is there, it is quite possible that His existence cannot be proved by Inference.

‘People whose eye of Cognition is dull.’—The Cognition is the Eye; and those whose this eye is dull.

Then again, it has been pointed out before that the Means of Cognition cannot be the ‘cause’ or the ‘pervader’ of things; how then, can the absence of Inference—which is neither the ‘cause’ nor the ‘pervader’ of the thing in question (the Omniscient Person),—lead to the absence of that thing?—The compound ‘ahetvavyāpakam’ is Copulative—what is ‘not cause—nor pervader’.

Nor can it be asserted that—“when the Means of Cognition called ‘Inference’ is inoperative,—even though it is neither the ‘Cause’ nor the ‘Pervader’ of the thing concerned,—the thing is actually found to be nonexistent; and there can be nothing incongruous in what is actually seen”.

In view of such an assertion, the Text adds—‘Even when the Inference is not possible, etc. etc.’.—Even when the Inference is not there, the thing in question has been found to exist; as in the case of the Red-hot Iron-Ball; as has been pointed out already.—(3303-3306)