The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3301-3302 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3301-3302.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

नेत्रादीनां हि वैकल्ये वस्तुसत्त्वेऽपि न प्रमा ।
तेषामविकलत्वेऽपि वस्त्वभावाद्धटादिवत् ॥ ३३०१ ॥
ततश्चानुपलम्भस्य केवलस्य द्विधेक्षणात् ।
तत्प्रमाभावतोऽप्यस्तु सर्वज्ञे संशयो वरम् ॥ ३३०२ ॥

netrādīnāṃ hi vaikalye vastusattve'pi na pramā |
teṣāmavikalatve'pi vastvabhāvāddhaṭādivat || 3301 ||
tataścānupalambhasya kevalasya dvidhekṣaṇāt |
tatpramābhāvato'pyastu sarvajñe saṃśayo varam || 3302 ||

When there is a defect in the eye, there is no cognition, even though the thing is there; and even when the eye is free from defects, there is no cognition, because the thing is not there;—as in the case of things like the jar.—Thus, inasmuch as mere non-apprehension (absence of cognition) is found in both cases, it is far better to hold that it is doubt that arises from the non-apprehension of the omniscient person.—(3301-3302)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—“In no case is it found that the Means of Cognition are not applicable to both existence and non-existence of a thing”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3301-3302 above]

Even when the object, Jar for instance, is there, if the man is without the Eye, he has no cognition of it;—so also, even when the Eye is perfect, if the object is not there,—in the sense that it is not close by,—there is no cognition of it; this clause has to be construed here also;—this is just what happens in the case of the Jar which is not there in a suitable place.

Mere Non-apprehension’—i.e. non-apprehension without the qualification of ‘perceptibility’ of the thing concerned.

Found in both cases’—i.e. in the case of existence and in the case of non-existence.

Tat’—Therefore.

It is far belter, etc. etc.’—better than searching for a perfect source. For instance, when things have had the idea of their being due to a perfect source cut off by wrong cognition,—there may be a desire to look out for the perfect source; as has been declared in the words—‘Two perceptions describe the junction, and two perceptions give rise to the desire’ (?)—It is for this reason that our Teachers affirm the presence of Doubt in such cases, in the words—‘If it is asked what is the proof for His existence?—the answer is that, for this same reason, let the matter remain in Doubt’,—(3301-3302)

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