Verse 2969

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

वृत्तावभ्यासवत्यां तु वैलक्षण्यं प्रतीयते ।
अतद्विषयतो ज्ञानादाद्ये(ऽ)प्राप्तेऽपि तत्फले ॥ २९६९ ॥

vṛttāvabhyāsavatyāṃ tu vailakṣaṇyaṃ pratīyate |
atadviṣayato jñānādādye(')prāpte'pi tatphale || 2969 ||

In the case of the initial cognition also, even though its effect may not have been seen, if the cognition has been repeated, a distinct peculiarity is perceived in it which differentiates it from cognitions not pertaining to the thing concerned, [and this establishes its validity].—(2969)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

A particular cognition may appear as initially clear and distinct, with all grounds of suspicion regarding its invalidity dispelled by repeated experience; as is found in the case of mystics and in that of experts in gems and coins; in the same manner, in other cases also, through repeated experience a clear and distinct cognition may appear, in regard to which all grounds of suspicion regarding invalidity have been dispelled; and it produces immediately after itself a Cogitative Cognition envisaging an object of the same kind,—and thereby it becomes cognised as dissociated from those heterogeneous things which have not figured in the preceding cognition;—in this way its validity is spoken of as being due to itself.

Some people hold the following opinion:—“Even when the cognition is repeated, there is certainty regarding its validity, in the shape of the capacity to bring about its effect,—and this certainty is brought about by Inference based upon the Probans in the form of ‘similarity’; so that in all cases validity is cognised through extraneous causes,—and never by the cognition by itself”.

This view, however, we fail to comprehend. Because it is necessary to explain from what resource arises the conviction regarding the said Probans itself in the shape of similarity that is not confused.—If it be said that—“it is obtained through repetition”,—then, it means that through repetition, it is possible to cognise unconfused similarity, which is common to homogeneous things, and which serves to differentiate heterogeneous things,—because there are no grounds for wrong cognition. If that is so, then whence the hostility to validity itself,—whereby its cognition is denied, even when there are no grounds for wrong cognition?

Further, what is this ‘similarity’ that is cognised i If it consists in ‘being of the form of cognition’,—this is present in wrong cognition also; hence the Reason becomes ‘inconclusive—If it consists in ‘appearing in the red form’ (in the case of the bunch of Aśoka-blossoms and Fire),—this is present in the blossoms also; hence the Reason becomes ‘false—If it consists in ‘producing the effect of Fire’,—then it has to be explained, how this character is ascertained.—If for the proving of this, another Inferential Indicative is sought for, then there is infinite regress.—It might be argued that—“the similarity is cognised by itself, even without the help of the Inferential Indicative, by direct Perception, through repetition”, But in that case, if repetition is admitted to possess such capacity,—then why is it not admitted that certainty regarding the capacity (of Cognitions and things) also can come without the help of Inferential Indicatives?—Then again, if it has been established that it is the effect of the cognition, then it is absolutely futile to follow up the Invariable Concomitance; as the recognition of ‘being the effect of the Cognition’ would itself, like the Inferential Cognition, prove the capacity of getting at its objective (in the shape of fruitful activity). That is to say, Inferential Cognition is brought about through the perception of the Probans as concomitant with the thing concerned, and thereby it becomes cognised as brought about, indirectly, by that thing; and it is on this ground that it is regarded as valid by itself,—and not through similarity; as otherwise, there would be an Infinite Regress;—in the same manner, in the case in question, the validity of the cognition would be self-sufficient by itself. Because, in a case where, even when it is known with certainty that the Probans resides in the ‘Subject’, the cognition of the Probandum does not come about;—and in such a ease the investigator would seek for the concomitance of the Probans in a Corroborative Instance; e.g. in the ease of ‘being an effect’ and ‘non-eternality’;—in the case in question, however, the capacity of the cognition to get at its objective is proved by the fact of that being its effect and hence non-separable from it; consequently, similarity cannot serve as an Indicative, in this case.

Says the Opponent—“If that is so, then how is it that your Teacher has made the following assertion in reference to the Materialist:—‘When the Materialist says that Perception is the only Means of Cognition, and Inference is not so,—and finds that while some particular perceptions are in consonance with the reality of things, while others are not so, the necessary definition could be so propounded only on the basis of Invariable Concomitance,—for the benefit of a person who would regulate his activity in accordance with this definition; and the definition thus propounded on the basis of similarity to what has been seen cannot escape from being something inferred’.”

This does not affect us. This assertion has been made by our Teacher with reference to those cognitions of unapprehended things which appear in one’s own ‘chain’ as well as in the ‘chain’ of others; that this is so is clear from the subsequent qualifying clause—‘apart from the cognitions of apprehended things If it were not so, if validity in all cases were to be ascertained through similarity, then the qualifying exception ‘apart from the cognitions of apprehended things’ would be meaningless.

From all this it follows that that cognition, which appears as having all grounds of mistake dispelled by repetition, is self-sufficient in its validity.—(2969)