Verse 2921-2922

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

आत्मलाभे घटादीनां कारणापेक्षितेष्यते ।
लब्धात्मनां स्वकार्येषु प्रवृत्तिः स्वयमेव तु ॥ २९२१ ॥
यत्तु ज्ञानं त्वयाऽपीष्टं जन्मानन्तरमस्थिरम् ।
लब्धात्मनोऽसतः पश्चाद्व्यापारस्तस्य कीदृशः ॥ २९२२ ॥

ātmalābhe ghaṭādīnāṃ kāraṇāpekṣiteṣyate |
labdhātmanāṃ svakāryeṣu pravṛttiḥ svayameva tu || 2921 ||
yattu jñānaṃ tvayā'pīṣṭaṃ janmānantaramasthiram |
labdhātmano'sataḥ paścādvyāpārastasya kīdṛśaḥ || 2922 ||

It is only for the securing of their existence that things like the jar stand in need of a cause; when once they have secured their existence, they become operative by themselves towards their own effects.—(2921)

That cognition which you also regard as not lasting after being born, becomes non-existent after having secured its existence; what sort of activity or operation, then, could it have?—(2922)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 2921]:

[This is a parody of the Mīmāṃsaka’s assertion in Text 2848.]

Question:—“Why can this not be possible in the case of Cognition also? [why should it be restricted to things like the Jar only? ]”

Answer:—[see verse 2922 above]

[verse 2922]:

‘What activity could the non-existent Cognition have?’—none whatsoever; because what is non-existent is devoid of all capacity.

Even if it existed, as all entities are without desire and effort, they could not have any activity. Nor is there any effect to be produced by the Cognition, towards which the Cognition could operate.

“But there is to be produced by it the effect in the shape of making its object cognised”.

Not so; ‘making cognised its own object’ means exactly the same that is meant by the term ‘Cognition’; so your assertion would mean that the Cognition produces itself; indeed a most excellent assertion!

“The effect of the Cognition would be the bringing about of the certainty that the Cognition is right and valid.”

That is not possible; because in the case of some Cognitions, there is no certainty; and in some the contrary is found to be the case.

What has been said has also shown that the present Proposition of the Mīmāṃsaka is contrary to Perception and other means of Cognition. For instance, if there is non-apprehension of what fulfills the conditions of perceptibility, and there is apprehension of something else,—it follows that what is non-existent cannot have any activity. The same is also proved by Inference,—being, as it is, formless, like the ‘sky-lotus’.

The phrase ‘which you also regard’ serves to point out that what has been asserted by the Mīmāṃsaka involves self-contradiction on his part.—(2922)

This same self-contradiction is pointed out in the following:—[see verses 2923-2924 next]