The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2911-2912 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2911-2912.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यथाचाविदितैरेव चक्षुरादिभिरिन्द्रियैः ।
गृह्यन्ते विषयाः सर्वे प्रमाणैरपि ने तथा ॥ २९११ ॥
तेनात्र ज्ञायमानत्वं प्रामाण्ये नोपयुज्यते ।
विषयानुभवोऽप्यस्मादज्ञातादेव लभ्यते ॥ २९१२ ॥

yathācāviditaireva cakṣurādibhirindriyaiḥ |
gṛhyante viṣayāḥ sarve pramāṇairapi ne tathā || 2911 ||
tenātra jñāyamānatvaṃ prāmāṇye nopayujyate |
viṣayānubhavo'pyasmādajñātādeva labhyate || 2912 ||

“Just as objects are apprehended by the eye and other sense-organs, which latter are themselves uncognised,—so, in the same manner are things apprehended by cognitions also, without these latter being themselves cognised. Hence becoming cognised is not of much use in the validity of the cognition. For the same reason the apprehension of things also is obtained from the cognition that is itself uncognised.”—(2911-2912)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—until, the Cognition itself has been cognised, the apprehension of its objective cannot be possible, as has been thus declared—‘There can be no perception of the object for one who has had no perception of the Cognition itself’.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2911-2912 above]

This is easily understood.—(2911-2912)

If that is so, then the invalidity also of Cognitions could, in the same way, be regarded as inherent in them.—Anticipating this objection, the Mīmāṃsaka provides the following answer:—[see verse 2913 next]

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