The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2910 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2910.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

प्रमाणं ग्रहणात्पूर्वं स्वरूपेण प्रतिष्ठितम् ।
निरपेक्षं च तत्स्वार्थे प्रमिते मीयते परैः ॥ २९१० ॥

pramāṇaṃ grahaṇātpūrvaṃ svarūpeṇa pratiṣṭhitam |
nirapekṣaṃ ca tatsvārthe pramite mīyate paraiḥ || 2910 ||

“Before the cognition is apprehended, it remains there in its own form; and so far as its own objective is concerned, it is independent and self-sufficient and after its own objective has been cognised, the cognition itself comes to be cognised by other cognitions.”—(2910)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

What is meant is as follows:—Even though in regard to the definite cognition of its own form, the Cognition requires another Cognition,—yet there can be no end to business-transactions; because in regard to the apprehension of its own objective, the Cognition is independent and self-sufficient; and when the object has become apprehended, then by that alone can all transactions be carried on; what use then would there be for considering whether there is certainty or uncertainty? Because the sole purpose of all this lies in the definite cognition of the object concerned. Such in brief is the purport of the argument.

The meaning of the words is now explained—

Before the cognition is apprehended’—i.e. before the certainty that ‘this is valid’.

In its own form’—i.e. in the form of the apprehension of the thing.

Independent’—i.e. not depending upon another cognition, for the purpose of the apprehension of its object.

When this—its object—has become duly cognised, with certainty,—then, later on, the Cognition itself becomes cognised through Inference, etc. This has been thus declared—‘One does not apprehend the Cognition until the object has been cognised; when the object has become cognised, then the Cognition becomes cognised by means of Inference’.—(2910)

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