The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2737-2742 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2737-2742.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

धर्मिभेदविकल्पेन याऽऽश्रयासिद्धिरुच्यते ।
सोऽनुमालक्षणाज्ञानाद्धर्मित्वं भासिनो यतः ॥ २७३७ ॥
अविचारप्रसिद्धोर्थो योयं ज्ञानेऽवभासते ।
शनकादेरपि प्रोक्ता तावन्मात्रस्य धर्मिता ॥ २७३८ ॥
तत्रैव हि विवादोऽयं संप्रवृत्तः प्रवादिनाम् ।
इच्छारचितभेदे तु न विवादोऽस्ति कस्यचित् ॥ २७३९ ॥
अतोऽविशेषनिर्दिष्टे विशेषेण विकल्पनम् ।
सर्वस्यैवानुमानस्य प्रवृत्तिं प्रतिवाधते ॥ २७४० ॥
चोदनाजनिता बुद्धिः प्रमाणं दोषवर्जितैः ।
कारणैर्जन्यमानत्वादित्याद्यपि विकल्प्यते ॥ २७४१ ॥
नित्यनित्यार्थसम्बद्धचोदनाजनिता मतिः ।
पक्षश्चेदाश्रयासिद्धिः परं प्रत्यनुषज्यते ॥ २७४२ ॥

dharmibhedavikalpena yā''śrayāsiddhirucyate |
so'numālakṣaṇājñānāddharmitvaṃ bhāsino yataḥ || 2737 ||
avicāraprasiddhortho yoyaṃ jñāne'vabhāsate |
śanakāderapi proktā tāvanmātrasya dharmitā || 2738 ||
tatraiva hi vivādo'yaṃ saṃpravṛttaḥ pravādinām |
icchāracitabhede tu na vivādo'sti kasyacit || 2739 ||
ato'viśeṣanirdiṣṭe viśeṣeṇa vikalpanam |
sarvasyaivānumānasya pravṛttiṃ prativādhate || 2740 ||
codanājanitā buddhiḥ pramāṇaṃ doṣavarjitaiḥ |
kāraṇairjanyamānatvādityādyapi vikalpyate || 2741 ||
nityanityārthasambaddhacodanājanitā matiḥ |
pakṣaścedāśrayāsiddhiḥ paraṃ pratyanuṣajyate || 2742 ||

The ‘inadmissibility of the reason in respect of its substratum’ which has been sought to be proved by the putting forward of a number of likely alternatives regarding the nature of the ‘subject’ (word),—is all due to ignorance of the real character of inference; because the ‘subject’ is always that which actually appears (in consciousness). What actually appears in consciousness is well-known, without cogitation;—even ordinary fishermen know that that alone can form the ‘subject’.—And yet, it is on this very point that dispute has arisen among babblers. There can be no dispute regarding a thing where diversity is created only through one’s whim.—(2737-2739)

When the ‘subject’ has been spoken of without qualifications, the setting up of alternatives regarding qualifications would put a stop to all inferential processes.—Even with regard to the (mīmāṃsaka’s) inference that—“the idea derived from the Vedic injunction must be right, because it is brought about by causes free from defect”,—several such alternatives could be urged against him, as—‘if the subject is meant to be the cognition brought about by injunctions that are eternal and related to eternal denotations, then the probans is one whose substratum is not admitted by the other party.’—(2740-2742)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verses 2737-2739]

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka, under Text 2310, that—It has to be explained what the Word-Sound is which is being proved to be perishable, etc, etc.”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2737-2739 above]

When the ‘Subject’ has been indicated in the unqualified form, the setting up of a number of alternatives regarding its qualification constitutes a ‘Futile Rejoinder—This is what is pointed out in the following:—[see verses 2740-2742 above]

[verses 2740-2742]:

The Injunction is itself eternal,—and is related to the eternal denotation,—in the shape of the ‘Universal’;—the cognition brought about by such an Injunction;—if that is the ‘Subject’, then the Probans is one that cannot be admitted by the other party.—(2740-2742)

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