Verse 2076

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अलक्षितविशेषा च बाह्यरूपे च सा स्मृतिः ।
सर्वतो भिन्नरूपे तु न साऽभ्यासाद्यसम्भवात् ॥ २०७६ ॥

alakṣitaviśeṣā ca bāhyarūpe ca sā smṛtiḥ |
sarvato bhinnarūpe tu na sā'bhyāsādyasambhavāt || 2076 ||

The remembrance that has been cited certainly appertains to the apprehended object;—only its special features are not clearly remembered. the remembrance does not pertain to anything as distinct prom everything else; because repeated experience and other conditions cannot be there.—(2076)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Text supplies the answer to the argument urged (by Kumārila, under 2071, above) that—People have the notion ‘I do not remember, etc. etc.’”:—[see verse 2076 above]

What is meant to be asserted here is the fact that it cannot be ‘admitted’ that “there is no Remembrance of the Apprehended Object when there is Remembrance of the Apprehending Cognition”.

The following might be urged:—“If the Remembrance pertains to the Apprehended Object, then why should its special features not be remembered,—when as a matter of fact, one would naturally remember the object as differentiated from all other like and unlike things, exactly as it has been apprehended. Otherwise if it did not apprehend its ‘difference’ from other things, how could it appertain to it? There would certainly be incongruities”.

The answer to this is—‘The Remembrance does not pertain, etc. etc’.—What is meant is as follows:—Conception has not the capacity to apprehend, things exactly as they exist,—because it does not envisage a real entity; what happens is that, when there has been apprehension of a certain thing,—the subsequent Remembrance that appears appertains to only that aspect of the thing with reference to which there happen to be such predisposing causes as the man’s being in need of the thing concerned and so forth; so that the Remembrance itself is always devoid of the object-element. What happens in reality is that it really manifests itself alone, and by imposing the objective character upon what is purely subjective, all Remembrance becomes wrong (false); and when a certain Remembrance is relegated to a certain Object, it is only because of the conception, not because there is any real connection between the two. It is not true that the conception of the Apprehended Object is present in Remembrance; and it appears in a form in which the special features of the Object are not conceived, because the varying grades of contact and repeated experience that would be necessary for such conception of the special features are absent. It is on this account (of the vague conception of the Object) that one Remembrance is distinguished from another.—(2076)