Verse 2077-2078

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

गृहीत इति कोऽप्येवं नान्यथा स्मरणं भवेत् ।
शुद्धस्फटिकसंकाशं वेद्यते स्मरणं नच ॥ २०७७ ॥
कम्बुपीतादिविज्ञानैर्हेतोः पश्चिमयोरपि ।
अनैकान्तिकता व्यक्तं दिगेषाऽन्यत्र साधने ॥ २०७८ ॥

gṛhīta iti ko'pyevaṃ nānyathā smaraṇaṃ bhavet |
śuddhasphaṭikasaṃkāśaṃ vedyate smaraṇaṃ naca || 2077 ||
kambupītādivijñānairhetoḥ paścimayorapi |
anaikāntikatā vyaktaṃ digeṣā'nyatra sādhane || 2078 ||

If it were not so, then there could be no remembrance in the form ‘some object had been apprehended’; for remembrance is never cognised as a piece of pure rock-crystal.—The two last reasons (cited by Kumārila) also are clearly ‘inconclusive’, in view of such cognitions as that of the ‘yellow conch-shell’.—This is the way to deal with the other reasons also.—(2077-2078)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Question:—“How do you know that there is idea of the Apprehended Object involved in the Remembrance?”

Answer:—[see verses 2077-2078 above]

If the Remembrance did not envisage the Object even in the vague undifferentiated form, then it could not appear even in the vague general form that ‘Some object had been apprehended Nor is even a Cognition remembered in the form of the pure Rock-crystal, without the imprint of the form of the Object apprehended (and remembered);—by virtue of which it could be asserted that “They remember the appearance of the Apprehending Cognition devoid of the form of the Apprehended Object” as has been asserted by [Kumārila, under Text 2071, above].

Thus it cannot be admitted that “there is no Remembrance of the Object when the Cognition is remembered”.

As regards the last two Reasons put forward (by Kumārila in Texts 2067 and in 2068)—“Because it proceeds from Cognition” (2067) and “Because it is Cognition” (2068),—these are ‘Falsified’ (Inconclusive) by such instances as the following:—The Cognition of the Yellow Conch-shell, though ‘proceeding from Cognition’, does apprehend its own subjective factor in the shape of yellow;—and also while being ‘Cognition’, it brings about the Cognition of the yellow which is part of the Cognition; and so could other Cognitions also do. Hence the two Reasons are ‘Inconclusive—As regards the Cognition of the ‘Yellow Conch-shell’, it has been already proved that it is devoid of objective basis; hence what the Cognition of the ‘Yellow Conch-shell’ apprehends is only that form of Yellow which exists in the Cognition alone (as a subjective factor); and to that extent it proves the fact of Cognition being self-cognised.

‘This is the way, etc. etc.’—‘With the other Reasons’,—that is, other Reasons that the other party has adduced in proof of the existence of the External Thing.

It has been asked by the other party—“What sort of one-ness (of the two) is sought to be proved? Is it meant to be on the ground that there is no such thing as appears in the form of Blue, etc., nor any form of Cognition, such as is met with in experience? How can any such idea be entertained? As if it were so, this would mean a negation of all things”.

The answer to this is as follows:—There would not be negation of all things. Because all that is non-existent by its very nature is the apprehensible thing, like Earth, etc., apart from the Cognition itself. As for ‘another Chain’, that does not exist as something apprehensible, and hence it is devoid of the apprehensible form. And as for the fact of the Cognition being the Active Agent in relation to it,—on the basis of the idea that the Cognition also cognises,—that active agency also is not there; and hence that too is devoid of the ‘apprehensible form’;—not so the ‘active agency’ in relation to the Specific Individuality of the Cognition itself; as everything cannot be brought about by everything.—This has been thus described—

‘When the Blue, Yellow and the like appear in Cognition as something external,—there does not, in reality, exist anything cognisable, outside; hence the idea of the Cognition being the active agent in relation to that is not true; hence what appears as Cognition is the only one reality, without a second—Under this understanding, the following text of the Prajñāpāramitā also becomes comprehensible Cognition is devoid of the nature of Cognition, in the sense that it is devoid of any definite characteristics’.—(2077-2078)