The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1986-1987 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1986-1987.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

परस्परविरुद्धात्मनैकरूपं कथं भवेत् ।
संवित्तेश्च विरुद्धानामेकस्मिन्नाप्यसम्भवः ॥ १९८६ ॥
एकाकारं न चे(भवे ?)देकमिति नेश्वरभाषितम् ।
तथाहि तदुपेतव्यं यद्यथैवोपलभ्यते ॥ १९८७ ॥

parasparaviruddhātmanaikarūpaṃ kathaṃ bhavet |
saṃvitteśca viruddhānāmekasminnāpyasambhavaḥ || 1986 ||
ekākāraṃ na ce(bhave ?)dekamiti neśvarabhāṣitam |
tathāhi tadupetavyaṃ yadyathaivopalabhyate || 1987 ||

How could one and the same thing have two mutually contradictory forms (and characters)?—(1986a)
“As is actually found to be the case, it is not impossible for one and the same thing to have contradictory characters, that ‘one thing should have one and only one form’ is not a royal edict—in fact everything has to be accepted as it is perceived.”—[Ślokavārtika-śūnyavāda, 219]—(1986-1987)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 1986a]:

Further, the assertion that ‘one thing has two forms’ involves, not only a self-contradiction, but it also implies what is more damaging, that the one thing has two mutually contradictory forms.—This is what is ṣhovn in the following—[see verse 1986a]

The two forms—Common and Uncommon—are such that the absence of one implies the presence of tlie other and vice versa; how then can any single thing have these two forms?—(1986)

The following Text sets forth the view of Kumārila:—[see verses 1986b-1987 above]

[verses 1986b-1987]:

Kumārila argues thus:—“It is not true that mutually contradictory forms cannot belong to any one thing;—why?—because it is actually found to be the case.—Further, there is no such Edict of Kings that ‘one thing must have only one form’;—in fact, everything should be accepted to be exactly as it is found; as all notions of things are based upon our Cognition of the same. As a matter of fact, the Cognition that is found to appear in connection with things is in one form,—as in the form of ‘Being’—and also in many forms; hence the nature of each thing has to be determined on the basis of the way in which it is actually cognised.”—(1986-1987)

The answer to the above is as follows:—[see verse 1988 next]

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