Verse 1939-1941

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

भिन्नदेहश्रितत्वेऽपि तद्विशेषानुकारतः ।
एकसन्ततिसम्बद्धं प्राच्यज्ञानं प्रबन्धवत् ॥ १९३९ ॥
अपि च स्तनपानादावभिलाषे प्रवर्त्तते ।
उद्वेग उपघाते च सद्योजन्मभृतामपि ॥ १९४० ॥
रुदितस्तनपानादिकार्येणासौ च गम्यते ।
स च सर्वो विकल्पात्मा स च नामानुषङ्गवान् ॥ १९४१ ॥

bhinnadehaśritatve'pi tadviśeṣānukārataḥ |
ekasantatisambaddhaṃ prācyajñānaṃ prabandhavat || 1939 ||
api ca stanapānādāvabhilāṣe pravarttate |
udvega upaghāte ca sadyojanmabhṛtāmapi || 1940 ||
ruditastanapānādikāryeṇāsau ca gamyate |
sa ca sarvo vikalpātmā sa ca nāmānuṣaṅgavān || 1941 ||

Even though the two cognitions subsist in two different bodies, yet, by reason of the later cognition appearing in the same particular character as the preceding one, the later cognition is connected with the same ‘chain’ with which the previous cognition is connected.—Further, even in the case of newly-born infants, there is activity towards sucking the breast, as also displeasure at being baulked; all which is inferred from such acts as crying, sucking the breast and so forth.—All this is of the nature of conceptual cognition, and conceptual cognition is associated with names (verbal expression).—(1939-1941)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘By reason of the later Cognition, etc. etc.’—That, is, the Cognitions of the present life appear with the same peculiarities as the Cognitions of the previous life. This has been thus declared—‘Through repeated practice, good and evil deeds appear in the nature of men; and these same appear in future lives, without any instruction,—like a dream’.

The Materialist has argued as follows:—“The Body in this world and the Body in the ‘other world’ being entirely different, the Chain of the Cognitions in those two bodies cannot be one and the same; so that the first Cognition that appears in the Foetus cannot belong to the same Chain as the Cognition under dispute,—because they belong to different bodies,—like the Cognitions of the Buffalo, the Boar and other animals”,

This also becomes refuted by what has been said above.

Then again, for the following reason also the existence of the ‘other world’ should be admitted:—Every Conceptual Cognition is preceded by the repeated Cognition of words,—because it is Conceptual,—like the Conceptual Thoughts occurring in youth and old age;—the Conceptual Cognition involved in the desire for sucking the breast and so forth appearing in newborn infants is Conceptual;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

The Reason cannot be said to be one which has an unadmitted substratum; because the existence of the Minor Term in the shape of the desire for sucking the breast, etc., is proved by such effects in newborn infants as crying and actual breast-sucking; such crying and breast-sucking cannot be possible in one who has no conception of liking and disliking.

Nor is the Reason ‘inadmissible by itself’;—this is shown by the words ‘all this is of the nature of Conceptual, etc. etc. All this’—i.e. the desire for breast-sucking, etc,—is of the nature of Conceptual Thought; because it is apprehended as something sought after.

That the Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’ is shown by the words—‘is associated with names ‘Saḥ’ stands for Conceptual Cognition. Inasmuch as Conceptual Cognition is associated with verbal expression, it is said to be ‘associated with names’, This ‘association with names’,—of the Conceptual Cognition—is not possible without repeated Convention; as has been explained by us already in detail.—(1939-1941)