The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1932-1933 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1932-1933.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तयोर्भावेप्यतीतादिविकल्पो यः प्रवर्त्तते ।
असदर्थोपरागेण तुल्य एवावसीयते ॥ १९३२ ॥
शब्दार्थप्रतिभासित्वाद्वस्तुरूपं न भासते ।
विकल्पेष्विति सर्वं हि विस्तरेणोपपादितम् ॥ १९३३ ॥

tayorbhāvepyatītādivikalpo yaḥ pravarttate |
asadarthoparāgeṇa tulya evāvasīyate || 1932 ||
śabdārthapratibhāsitvādvasturūpaṃ na bhāsate |
vikalpeṣviti sarvaṃ hi vistareṇopapāditam || 1933 ||

Even on the presence of the sense-organ and the object, the conceptual cognition that appears in relation to the past, etc. should be regarded as on the same footing as the conception that envisages a non-entity. It has been already explained in detail that the form of an entity cannot figure in conceptual cognitions, because they involve verbal expressions.—(1932-1933)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged “The Conceptual Cognition of the Sky-lotus and such things may be independent of the Sense-organ and the Object,—because it comes about even in the absence of these latter; how could the Conceptual Cognition however, which appears when the Eye is fixed upon the Blue object before one, be independent of the Sense-organ and Object,—which could save the Probans from being ‘inadmissible’ in regard to a part of the ‘Subject’ (Minor Term)?”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 1932-1933 above]

Tayoḥ’—of the Sense-organ and the Object.

Asadarthoparāgeṇa’—is ‘that which envisages what does not exist’,—i.e. the conception of things like the Sky-lotus,—On the same footing as this would be the conception relating to the Past (if Cognitions were dependent upon the actual presence of the Object cognised).

“How so?”

All Conceptual Cognitions appear as associated with verbal expressions, and hence they envisage verbal expressions also; and that which envisages the verbal expression cannot envisage an entity; because verbal expressions do not bear upon the form of things; as words are not fixed by Convention in relation to the actual form of things.—All this has been explained in detail under the Chapter on ‘Word and its Denotation’ (Chapter XVI).

The Reason is present in everything where the Probandum is known to be present; hence it cannot be regarded as ‘Contradictory’,—Nor is it ‘Inconclusive’; because if the Cognition were not produced from its own cause, it would have to be regarded as without cause.—(1932-1933)

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: