Verse 1901-1906

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

परपक्षे च तज्ज्ञानं कायादेवेति संस्थितिः ।
दृष्टान्तौ तत्कथं सिद्धौ साध्यधर्मसमन्वितौ ॥ १९०१ ॥
ननु कायस्य हेतुत्वं प्रागेव विनिवारितम् ।
चेतसो युगपत्प्राप्तेरभावाच्चातिरेकिणः ॥ १९०२ ॥
अाभोगशुभचित्तादिभावित्वेन विनिश्चितम् ।
स्मृतिरागादिविज्ञानं तन्निषेद्धुं न पार्यते ॥ १९०३ ॥
(श्रुतशिल्पादिकाभ्यासविशेषह्रासवृद्धितः) ॥ १९०४ ॥
(मनस्कारे तु)विगुणे ज्ञातव्यार्थान्तराग्रहात् ।
ज्ञानस्य ज्ञानहेतुत्वं न याति वचनीयताम् ॥ १९०५ ॥
विभिन्नदेहवृत्तित्वादिति हेतोरसिद्धता ।
(अमूर्तचेतसो)वृत्तिः का वा कायेष्वपातिनः १९०६ ॥

parapakṣe ca tajjñānaṃ kāyādeveti saṃsthitiḥ |
dṛṣṭāntau tatkathaṃ siddhau sādhyadharmasamanvitau || 1901 ||
nanu kāyasya hetutvaṃ prāgeva vinivāritam |
cetaso yugapatprāpterabhāvāccātirekiṇaḥ || 1902 ||
aाbhogaśubhacittādibhāvitvena viniścitam |
smṛtirāgādivijñānaṃ tanniṣeddhuṃ na pāryate || 1903 ||
(śrutaśilpādikābhyāsaviśeṣahrāsavṛddhitaḥ) || 1904 ||
(manaskāre tu)viguṇe jñātavyārthāntarāgrahāt |
jñānasya jñānahetutvaṃ na yāti vacanīyatām || 1905 ||
vibhinnadehavṛttitvāditi hetorasiddhatā |
(amūrtacetaso)vṛttiḥ kā vā kāyeṣvapātinaḥ || 1906 ||

“According to the other view, the idea is that consciousness proceeds from the body itself; how then can the two corroborative instances be admitted to be equipped with the probandum?”—(1901)

The idea of the body being the cause (of cognition) has been already discarded, on the ground of its involving the possibility of all cognitions appearing simultaneously, on account of there being no other (contributory) causes.—As a matter of fact, it is found that cognition in the form of remembrance, affection and so forth (which are cognitions) actually proceeds from pleasurable experiences and pleasant reminiscences of the same [which also are cognitions];—and this cannot be denied.—Then again, it is also seen that deterioration and improvement in one’s later cognitions are brought about by deterioration and improvement in the practice of the learning and arts.—It is also seen that when the functioning of the mind is defective, there is no apprehension of other things.—On account of all these facts, the idea of cognition proceeding from cognition cannot be objected to.—(1902-1905)

The reason—‘because they subsist in different bodies’—cannot be admissible. because how can there be any subsistence of the cognition, which is incorporeal and hence not liable to fall down, in the bodies?—(1906)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 1901]:

In the following Text, the Opponent urges the objection against both the above arguments,—that “the Corroborative Instances cited are devoid of the Probandum”:—[see verse 1901 above]

“The Probandum, that is desired to be proved, is that the Cognition proceeds from its own Material Cause and produces its own product; according to the other Party, however, Cognition is always produced from the Body itself; so that for him there can be no Instance which fulfils the conditions of the Probandum; why then has the Buddhist put forward the two instances of⁽the present Cognition’ and ‘the previous Cognition’?”

[The answer to this is as follows]—[see verses 1902-1905 above]

[verses 1902-1905]:

There is no force in the above objection. It has been already shown that the Body cannot be the cause of Cognition, on the ground that that would involve the simultaneity of Cognitions; because there is no other contributory cause which would be needed; and if the Body is eternal, it cannot require anything else; if on the other hand, it is not eternal, then the previous and the present, both objections, would be applicable. As a matter of fact, what is proved by proper means of Cognition cannot be set aside by mere assertion; as otherwise there would be incongruities; so that nothing could be the cause of anything at all. This is what has been described in the words ‘mere disagreeableness cannot render things objectionable’.

Further, it is found that after a pleasurable experience, when there is remembrance of it in a definite form, there proceeds, from this pleasurable Cognition, a feeling of love and attachment—‘How beautiful she is! So youthful and slim-waisted, with a handsome face I’ and so forth; when one goes on contemplating upon it there appears in the mind of the man inclined to be passionate, the passion of Love. Similarly when some one causes one an injury, one goes on thinking of it—‘He has done me this injury,—he has done it in the past—he is going to do it again’ and so forth; thereupon there appears Hatred.—How can all this be denied;—specially by one who takes Ms stand upon Sense-perception (as the only Bight means of Cognition)?

Similarly, when there is deterioration and improvement in the previous practice of Learning and Arts, it is found that there are corresponding deterioration and improvement in the subsequent Cognitions. And it is found that, when the Mind is attracted elsewhere and the functioning of the Mind is defective, there is no perception of other things.

From all this it is clear that the idea that Cognition is the Cause of Cognition, is in accordance with reason and should not be objected to; also because it has been actually proved that Cognition is the Cause of cognitions.—(1902-1905)

[verse 1906]:

Under Text 1861, it has been argued (by the Materialist) that)—“there cannot be any relation of Cause and Effect between the two Cognitions under dispute, because they subsist in different bodies”;—this Reason there put forward is not admissible. Because, if the ‘subsistence’ meant is that of the nature of ‘container and contained’, then such subsistence in the Bodies is entirely impossible for Cognition, which is not liable to fall; because even though the causal relation may be there, the Cognition, which is incorporeal, could never be liable to fall; and for what is not liable to fall, no container is needed, as it could serve no useful purpose.—(1906)

Question:—“What then would the Container (or Receptacle) do in the case of Water and such things?”

Answer:—[see verses 1907-1908 next]