The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1907-1908 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1907-1908.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

स्यादाश्रयो जलादीनां पतनप्रतिषेधतः ।
चेतसामगतीनां च किमाधारैः प्रयोजनम् ॥ १९०७ ॥
तादात्म्येन स्थितिर्वृत्तिरिह चेत्परिकल्प्यते ।
साऽप्ययुक्ता न हि ज्ञानं युक्तं कायात्मकं तव ॥ १९०८ ॥

syādāśrayo jalādīnāṃ patanapratiṣedhataḥ |
cetasāmagatīnāṃ ca kimādhāraiḥ prayojanam || 1907 ||
tādātmyena sthitirvṛttiriha cetparikalpyate |
sā'pyayuktā na hi jñānaṃ yuktaṃ kāyātmakaṃ tava || 1908 ||

In the case of water and other things, the receptacle (container) would be there as serving to prevent their falling down. in the case of cognitions however, which are devoid of movement (and hence of falling), what would be the use of receptacles (or containers)?—(1907)

If then, the ‘subsistence’ (of the cognitions in the bodies) be assumed to be of the nature of ‘identification’ (sameness’,—that also cannot be right. because for you, cognition cannot be of the nature of the body.—(1908)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 1907]:

In the ease of Earth, etc. which are corporeal, things are produced on the spot where the material, cause exists, and never in a place where that cause does not exist; hence that which serves as preventive of their moving away from that place is regarded as the Receptacle (Substratum, Container). No such thing is possible in the ease of what is incorporeal.—(1907)

[verse 1908]:

If what is meant by ‘Subsistence’ is ‘being of the same nature’,—that also cannot be admitted. For you, who insist upon the External Things only, it cannot be right to assert that ‘Cognition is of the nature of the Body’; though it is all right for me who posit the Cognition only; and for whom the Body also is of the nature of the Ālayavijñāna (a series or chain of Cognitions).—(1908)

Question:—“Why cannot it be right (to assert that Cognition is of the nature of the Body)?”

Answer:—[see verses 1909-1910 next]

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