by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 1816-1820 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1816-1820.
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
अभेदमनुमन्यन्ते कथमध्वसु वस्तुनः ।
ता अभूत्वा भवन्त्यश्च नश्यन्त्यश्च तदात्मिकाः ॥ १८१६ ॥
अवस्थायां च मध्यायां स्वरूपेणैव कारकम् ।
तत्तदेव स्वरूपं च दशयोरन्ययोरपि ॥ १८१७ ॥
तदा क्रियाक्रियाभ्रंशौ कथमस्य तयोर्मतौ ।
पररूपेण कर्तृत्वे प्राप्ताऽस्याकर्तृता पुनः ॥ १८१८ ॥
तत्साङ्कर्यादिदोषोऽयमस्मिन्पक्षे निरास्पदः ॥ १८१९ ॥
तदिदानीमभूत्वैव कार्ययोग्यं प्रजायते ।
न च तिष्ठति भूत्वेति सिद्धाऽस्यानन्वयात्मता ॥ १८२० ॥
abhedamanumanyante kathamadhvasu vastunaḥ |
tā abhūtvā bhavantyaśca naśyantyaśca tadātmikāḥ || 1816 ||
avasthāyāṃ ca madhyāyāṃ svarūpeṇaiva kārakam |
tattadeva svarūpaṃ ca daśayoranyayorapi || 1817 ||
tadā kriyākriyābhraṃśau kathamasya tayormatau |
pararūpeṇa kartṛtve prāptā'syākartṛtā punaḥ || 1818 ||
tatsāṅkaryādidoṣo'yamasminpakṣe nirāspadaḥ || 1819 ||
tadidānīmabhūtvaiva kāryayogyaṃ prajāyate |
na ca tiṣṭhati bhūtveti siddhā'syānanvayātmatā || 1820 ||
How do these people accept the view that there is non-difference between the entity and the states?—They (the states), not having been in existence, come into existence and then become destroyed;—how then could they be the same as the entity?—In the middle ‘state’, the entity is ‘active’ in its own form,—then, as the same form persists in other two states also, how could ‘activity’ and ‘cessation of activity’ be there in these two states?—If it is ‘active’, in the form of something else, then it ceases to be active again.—if, lastly, it be held that the fire and other things, in the past and future states, are different from the same in the present state,—then it is true that there would be no room for the objection that comingling and confusion would be involved; but even so, as the entity in the middle (present) state becomes capable of fruitful action only when it comes into existence after the time during which it was not in existence, and after having come into existence, it does not continue to exist,—there would be no continuity of existence for the entity.—(1816-1820)
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
How can any one accept the view that the states are non-different from the Entity?—No one can accept it.—Because the States come into existence after having been non-existent, and after having come into existence, they become destroyed;—while nothing like this happens to the Entity; because it has been held to be existent at all times. Under the circumstances, having been non-existent, then coming into existence and then ceasing to exist,—how could the States be the same in essence as the Entity?—They can never be so; because, they stand upon entirely different footings.—Otherwise, being the same as the Entity, the States also would have to be regarded as existing at all times,—just like the nature of the Entity; because they are non-different from the Entity; or (conversely) the Entity itself would have to be regarded as subject to non-existence before existence and so forth,—like the form of the States,
Even granting the assumption that the States are non-different from the Entity,—the objection based upon the attributing to them of mutually contradictory properties still remains unanswered. For instance, when the Entity is in the ‘middle’ (Present) state,—is it active in its own form? Or in the form of something else?
If it is active in its own form, then, as that same form would be there in the Past and Future states also,—how could this form of the active entity become active and inactive?
If it is active in the form of something else, then it ceases to be active; and hence becomes a non-entity.
Thus it is clear that it is not right to say that the same form is there in the Past and Future states also.
If then there is some other form (of the Entity) in these States,—then, under this view, there would be no room for the objection that it involves the confusion and comingling in the same thing of mutually contradictory properties of Activity and Inactivity,—because the Entity would not be the same. But (the other difficulty will remain, that) if the Entity, Fire, which is capable of such action as Burning and Cooking, comes into existence after having been non-existent, and having come into existence, it disappears,—this is incompatible with the doctrine of the permanent existence oi the Entity; because there is no continuity of existence.—(1816-1820)