The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1810-1815 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1810-1815.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

कारित्राख्या फलाक्षेपशक्तिर्या शब्दगोचरा ।
शक्तेरेव च वस्तुत्वात्सा प्रज्ञप्तिसती कथम् ॥ १८१० ॥
यच्चेदमिष्यते रूपं दाहपाकादिकार्यकृत् ।
अतीतानागतावस्थं किं तदेवाभ्युपेयते ॥ १८११ ॥
तदेव चेत्कथं नाम तस्यैवैकात्मनः सतः ।
अक्रिया च क्रिया चापि क्रियाविरतिरित्यपि ॥ १८१२ ॥
एकस्मिन्निर्विशिष्टेस्मिन्परस्परपराहताः ।
प्रकाराः कथमेते हि युज्यन्ते नाम वस्तुनि ॥ १८१३ ॥
एकावस्थापरित्यागे परावस्थापरिग्रहात् ।
नैवैतन्निर्विशिष्टं चेद्वस्त्वध्वस्विति कल्प्यते ॥ १८१४ ॥
किं वै भावाद्विभिद्यन्तेऽवस्था नाकर्तृताप्तितः ।
तासामेव हि सद्भावात्कार्यसत्तोपलभ्यते ॥ १८१५ ॥

kāritrākhyā phalākṣepaśaktiryā śabdagocarā |
śaktereva ca vastutvātsā prajñaptisatī katham || 1810 ||
yaccedamiṣyate rūpaṃ dāhapākādikāryakṛt |
atītānāgatāvasthaṃ kiṃ tadevābhyupeyate || 1811 ||
tadeva cetkathaṃ nāma tasyaivaikātmanaḥ sataḥ |
akriyā ca kriyā cāpi kriyāviratirityapi || 1812 ||
ekasminnirviśiṣṭesminparasparaparāhatāḥ |
prakārāḥ kathamete hi yujyante nāma vastuni || 1813 ||
ekāvasthāparityāge parāvasthāparigrahāt |
naivaitannirviśiṣṭaṃ cedvastvadhvasviti kalpyate || 1814 ||
kiṃ vai bhāvādvibhidyante'vasthā nākartṛtāptitaḥ |
tāsāmeva hi sadbhāvātkāryasattopalabhyate || 1815 ||

Firstly, the activity in question consists in ‘the capacity to throw out results’ and is capable of being spoken of; how can it be said to have an imaginary existence, when the capacity op things is an entity?—Secondly, the form that is admitted to be bringing about such effects as burning, cooking and the like,—is this same form held to be in the ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ states?—If it is the same, how can activity, inactivity and cessation of activity belong to the entity that has a single form?—How can these mutually contradictory modes be present in what is only one and undifferentiated?—If it is argued that—“because it abandons one ‘state’ and then takes up another, that entity cannot be undifferentiated, which passes through the states”,—then the question arises—are these ‘states’ different from the entity?—[The other party answers]—“no; as in that case, the entity would not be an active agent. because it is only through the existence of the ‘states’ that the existence of the effects is apprehended.”—(1810-1815)


Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Says the other party—“It may be that the Activity has a purely imaginary existence; and hence the distinction of the states based thereupon may also be only imaginary;—what is the harm in that?”—This is the view taken up in the following—[see verses 1810-1815 above]

You (Sahantabhadra) have explained that the capacity of entities to throw up their effects is what is meant by ‘Activity’;—now, how can this capacity to throw up effects have a merely imaginary existence? That is, it can never be so. Consequently the distinction of the ‘states’ based thereupon should also be accepted as real.

Further, the Form of Fire is found to be one that is capable of such efficient actions as those of Burning, Cooking, etc.;—is this the same that continues in the ‘Past’ and other states? Or is it different-? If it remains the same,—then how can such contradictory properties as ‘activity’, ‘inactivity’ and ‘cessation from activity’ belong to the said form winch is one and the same, totally undifferentiated?—And it is only through the presence of these properties that the Entity could have such states as the ‘Future’, ‘Present’ and ‘Past’ respectively. If, even in the presence of contradictory properties, the entity remained the same, then all ideas of Difference would become uprooted, and the entire universe would have to be regarded as one only. And such one-ness would mean that all things should be produced together at one and the same time.

It might be argued that—“By virtue of the variations undergone in the process of abandoning one state and taking up another,—the Entity in the three states is not entirely undifferentiated”.

But even so, are these states different or non-different (from the Entity)? This has got to be explained.

Bays the other Party—“They are not different;—i.e. they do not differ from the Entities.—‘Why?’—Because, in that case the Entity could not be an active agent; i.e. it would be inactive; as through positive and negative concomitance, it has been ascertained that efficient activity (causal efficiency) to produce effects belongs to the states only. [Hence by being different from the States, the Entity could not be an active agent]”.—(1810-1815)

The objections against this last view [that “the States are not different from the Entity”] are pointed out in the following—[see verses 1816-1820 next]

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