Verse 1680-1683

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तद्धेतुत्वात्प्रमाणं चेच्चक्षुरादिवदुच्यते ।
न नीरूपस्य हेतुत्वसम्भवोऽस्ति कदाचन ॥ १६८० ॥
ज्ञानरूपविविक्तश्च सोऽभावो गम्यते कथम् ।
तद्गोचरप्रमाभावादेवं तर्ह्यनवस्थितिः ॥ १६८१ ॥
वस्त्वभावात्प्रमाणस्य प्रमाभावाच्च वस्तुनः ।
नास्तिता यदि गम्येत भवेदन्योन्यसंश्रयः ॥ १६८२ ॥
तस्मादेकस्य या दृष्टिः सैवान्यादृष्टिरुच्यते ।
सा च स्वतन्त्रसंसिद्धिः स्वरूपेणाजडत्वतः ॥ १६८३ ॥

taddhetutvātpramāṇaṃ ceccakṣurādivaducyate |
na nīrūpasya hetutvasambhavo'sti kadācana || 1680 ||
jñānarūpaviviktaśca so'bhāvo gamyate katham |
tadgocarapramābhāvādevaṃ tarhyanavasthitiḥ || 1681 ||
vastvabhāvātpramāṇasya pramābhāvācca vastunaḥ |
nāstitā yadi gamyeta bhavedanyonyasaṃśrayaḥ || 1682 ||
tasmādekasya yā dṛṣṭiḥ saivānyādṛṣṭirucyate |
sā ca svatantrasaṃsiddhiḥ svarūpeṇājaḍatvataḥ || 1683 ||

If it is urged that—“negation is a means of cognition because—like the eye, etc.—It serves as the cause of cognition”,—then (our answer is that) what is entirely featureless can never serve as the cause of anything.—(1680)

Then again, being devoid of the form of cognition, how would the ‘negation’ be apprehended?—If it were held to be apprehended by the absence—i.e. negation—of the cognition relating to it,—then there would be no end (to the assumption of such negations).—If, then, the non-existence of the cognition were apprehended through the absence of the cognised thing,—and the non-existence of the cognised thing were apprehended through the absence, of cognition,—there would be mutual interdependence.—Hence the fact is that what is the perception of one thing is called the non-perception of another;—and the said perception comes about by itself, because by its very nature it is not-dark (self-luminous).—(1681-1683)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 1680]:

The following might be urged:—“The Eye and the other organs are not of the nature of the cognition of things,—and yet, as they serve as causes bringing about the cognition of things, they are called ‘Means of Cognition’; the same would be the case with ‘Negation’ also; so that the Reason adduced is not true (Inconclusive)”.

This is the argument anticipated and answered in the following—[see verse 1680 above]

It is not right to make assumptions on the basis of the figurative idea of being the ‘cause of cognition’; because what is entirely featureless and hence devoid of all capacity, cannot be rightly regarded as a Came. If it were so regarded, it would cease to be featureless; and further, as what is featureless cannot be specially related to any particular time or place, if a cognition were brought about by it, it would never cease at all.—(1680)

[verses 1681-1683]:

Then again, what is itself not known cannot bring about the Cognition of anything else;—if it did, it would lead to absurdities; this has been already explained; so it has to be explained in what way ‘Negation’ itself is known. It cannot be cognised by itself; as if it were so, then the negation, or absence, of the object also would be cognised by itself, and there would be no need for postulating a Means of Cognition in the shape of ‘Negation’; as this is meant only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of the negation of the object,—and this negation of the object will have been cognised by itself, like the negation of the Means of Cognition.—Nor can it be regarded as cognised by its own Cognition, because, ex hypothesis it is ‘devoid of the form of Cognition’;—how then could it be cognised by its own Cognition? It is only what is of the nature of Cognition that can be so cognised.

It might be argued that it could be known from another negation of the Means of Cognition bearing upon itself.—But then there arises the question—how is this latter Negation known?—If it were held to be due to yet another Negation,—then there would be an infinite regress. This has been thus declared:—‘Otherwise the non-existence of the Object is known through Non-apprehension, and the non-existence of the Apprehension is known by another Non-apprehension; so there is an infinite regress’.

In order to avoid this Infinite Regress, it may be held that the Cognition of Negation is due to the absence (Negation) of the Object.—But in that case there is mutual interdependence. For instance, the Negation of the Means of Cognition is cognised through the cognition of the Negation of the Object, and the negation of the Object is cognised through the Cognition of the negation of the Means of Cognition; thus the defect of mutual interdependence is quite clear.—Thus you are reduced to that condition where the thrust of the Javelin throws out the Eye-ball!

From all this it follows that the Non-apprehension of one thing consists only in the apprehension of another thing,—and ‘Negation’ need not be a Means of Cognition different from Perception.

The following might be urged:—“How is that apprehension of one thing known? What has been urged against the Cognition of Negation would apply to that also”.

The answer to this is that—‘the said Perception, etc. etc.’—That is, the Perception of the one thing becomes cognised by itself,—not through anything else; hence in this case there is no Infinite Regress.—“Why?”—Because, by its very nature,—in its own form,—it is not-dark,—i.e. it is of the nature of Light (which is self-luminous).—Nor would cognition through mere presence lead to incongruities, as nothing else (except Cognition) is of the nature of Light (i.e. self-luminous).—(1681-1683)

Question:—“Why should there be this hostility towards the apprehension of Cognition through something else?”

Answer:—[see verses 1684-1686 next]