Verse 1684-1687

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

बुद्धेरपरतः सिद्धिर्लिङ्गाद्बुद्ध्यन्तरादपि ।
अन्यथाऽनुपपत्तेर्वा सर्वथाऽपि न सम्भवः ॥ १६८४ ॥
त्रयपर्यनुयोगस्य प्रत्येकं सति सम्भवे ।
अनवस्थितयो बह्व्यो विसर्पिण्यः स्युरत्र ते ॥ १६८५ ॥
तुल्ययोग्यात्मनस्तस्मादेकस्यैवोपलम्भनात् ।
असन्निश्चययोग्यत्वमन्येषां संप्रतीयते ॥ १६८६ ॥
एकस्य कस्य संवित्तावचन्द्रं गम्यते नभः ।
सर्वशब्दविवेकश्च क्वचिन्निश्चीयते कथम् ॥ १६८७ ॥

buddheraparataḥ siddhirliṅgādbuddhyantarādapi |
anyathā'nupapattervā sarvathā'pi na sambhavaḥ || 1684 ||
trayaparyanuyogasya pratyekaṃ sati sambhave |
anavasthitayo bahvyo visarpiṇyaḥ syuratra te || 1685 ||
tulyayogyātmanastasmādekasyaivopalambhanāt |
asanniścayayogyatvamanyeṣāṃ saṃpratīyate || 1686 ||
ekasya kasya saṃvittāvacandraṃ gamyate nabhaḥ |
sarvaśabdavivekaśca kvacinniścīyate katham || 1687 ||

As a matter of fact, the apprehension of cognition through something else is not possible in anyway,—either (a) through the inferential indicative,—or (b) through another cognition (perception),—or (c) through presumption.—There being a possibility of objections being raised against all these three, there would be several infinite regresses creeping in for you.—[It must be admitted therefore that] as among things equally capable of being apprehended, the apprehension of one leads to the definite cognition that the others are non-existent.—(1684-1686)

“What is that one, thing on the cognition whereof the sky is cognised as moon-less? How too is the absence of all sound cognised anywhere?”—(1687)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verses 1684-1686]:

(1) Some people hold that Cognition is cognisable through the Inferential Indicative;—this Inferential Indicative being either in the form of the idea of a thing, or in that of an Action, or in that of a thing perceptible by the senses, or some manifest object, and so forth.

(2) Others hold that Cognition is perceived through another Cognition,—and not self-cognised,—because the operation of anything upon itself involves an incongruity.

(3) Others again hold that it is cognised through Presumption based upon the inexplicability (otherwise) of what is duly known; i.e. the idea of a thing being known would be inexplicable if the Cognition of the thing were not there, the Cognition itself being by its nature dull (non-intelligent, dark).

Thus these three theories have been put forward.

Now there being a possibility of objections being brought up against each of these three theories—relating to the Inferential Indicative and the rest,—such as—‘How is the Inferential Indicative itself known?’, and so forth, —there will be several Infinite Regresses creeping in:—For instance, the Inferential Indicative and the rest could not be cognised until Cognition is cognised; hence its cognition should be sought for from somewhere else;—and for that also, it would be necessary to have recourse to another Inferential Indicative and so forth. This same process being urged against each of the three theories,—there would be an endless Infinite Regress.

From all this, the right conclusion would be that the apprehension of one tiring brings about the Cognition of the non-existence of other things.—When one has to deny the time and place of things, the negation (denial) is made of the perceptible things themselves, as it is these latter that stand on the same footing as the thing that has been apprehended; it being impossible to deny anything else. If sameness were denied, then all would be denied,—as has been seen before; because all things become included under ‘what is not—that thing—which is apprehended’,—according to the principle that ‘what is not the same as one thing is another thing—(1684—1686)

[verse 1687]:

Question:—

[Says the Opponent]—“When a man notices the absence of the Moon in the Ākāśa, there is no apprehension of any one thing, by virtue of which it could be said that from the apprehension of that one thing follows the apprehension of the non-existence of other things; specially as there is no such real thing as Ākāśa which could he apprehended as devoid of the Moon. Even that Ākāśa which others have postulated as something real is beyond the reach of the senses.—Then again, when at a certain place the absence of sound is noticed,—from the apprehension of what one thing does that follow?—It cannot be urged that it follows from the apprehension of the spot on the ground concerned; because the ground is not equal to the Sound as regards its perceptibility,—because the ground is visible, while the Sound is audible; and what are meant to be mutually related in the present context are things that stand on the same footing regarding their perceptibility.—This is clear from the assertion that ‘one thing is other than the other when both are related to the same cognition and yet are not dependent upon one another—Nor can the cognition in question be said to proceed from the apprehension of Time; because there is no such category as ‘Time’ apart from the other categories, whose apprehension could be there. The Time that is accepted by the other party is also something beyond the senses—(1687)

The answer to the above is as follows:—[see verses 1688-1989 next]