Verse 1675-1677

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अर्थक्रियासमर्थं च सदन्यदसदुच्यते ।
समावेशो न चैकत्र तयोर्युक्तो विरोधतः ॥ १६७५ ॥
स्वसाध्यायां समर्थं चेदन्यस्यामक्षमं ननु ।
तदेतद्धि द्विरूपत्वं नैवैकत्रास्ति वस्तुनि ॥ १६७६ ॥
अन्यदेवासमर्थं तु यद्यन्यस्याभितीष्यते ।
द्वे तदा वस्तुनी प्राप्ते तन्नैकस्य द्विरूपता ॥ १६७७ ॥

arthakriyāsamarthaṃ ca sadanyadasaducyate |
samāveśo na caikatra tayoryukto virodhataḥ || 1675 ||
svasādhyāyāṃ samarthaṃ cedanyasyāmakṣamaṃ nanu |
tadetaddhi dvirūpatvaṃ naivaikatrāsti vastuni || 1676 ||
anyadevāsamarthaṃ tu yadyanyasyābhitīṣyate |
dve tadā vastunī prāpte tannaikasya dvirūpatā || 1677 ||

What is capable of effective action is said to be ‘existent’,—other than that is said to be ‘non-existent’; the two cannot exist together in the same substratum, as they are contradictory.—“But the same thing may be capable of that effective action which it can itself accomplish, but incapable of another (effective action)”.—It is for this reason that the dual character can never subsist in any single thing. If it is something else that is regarded as ‘incapable’ of the other action,—then there are two things; and the dual character does not belong to one and the same thing.—(1675-1677)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has thus been shown that the postulating of the two forms (aspects) of things is incompatible with Perception; the following Texts show that it is incompatible with Inference:—[see verse 1675-1677 above]

(A) That which is capable of effective action is ‘existent’,—for example that aspect of the thing winch is regarded as ‘existent’;—and what is held to be ‘non-existent’ is not capable of effective action;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

(B) Things that are mutually contradictory can never coexist in the same thing,—e.g. Light and Shade, or Heat and Cold,—the existent and nonexistent aspects are mutually contradictory;—so the idea that they coexist is contrary to a universal proposition.

The Opponent urges the objection that the Reason adduced is ‘inadmissible’—“The same thing, etc. etc.—That is to say, one and the same thing is capable of the effective action which can be accomplished by itself, and also incapable of that effective action which can he accomplished by others; hence the Probans based upon the capability for effective action cannot be admissible; because the tiring is not admitted as capable of efficient action, in regard to such action as can be accomplished by others. Nor is there any contradiction between ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’, as the two are in reference to distinct aspects of the thing; for instance, the thing is called ‘existent’ in reference to such effective action as can be accomplished by itself, and that same thing—not another—is called ‘non-existent’, in reference to such action as can be accomplished by others; there would have been ‘contradiction’ if it had been called ‘non-existent’ also in reference to the action accomplished by itself.”

The answer to this is as follows—‘As a matter of fact, etc. etc’;—That same thing -which is ‘capable’ of the action that can be accomplished by itself, is ‘incapable’ of that which can be accomplished by others;—and it is not any other thing. Things do not differ through difference in their relatives or through difference in words;—because the thing is impartite.

‘Tat’ stands for ‘tasmāt’, ‘for these reasons—For these reasons, the dual character can never belong to the same thing.

If it be held that—“the aspect that is incapable of such action as can be accomplished by others is different from that which is capable of effective action”. This is what is introduced by the words ‘If it is something else, etc. etc.’.

The answer to this is that there are two things;—that which is capable of effective action is one thing, and that which is incapable is the second thing; so that in saying what you have said, you have asserted the existence of two things, and not the dual aspect of one and the same thing,—(1675-1677)