Verse 1667-1670

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

शक्यदर्शनवस्त्वाभप्रत्यक्षस्यैव नास्तिता ।
एवं सति समाख्येयो नान्येषां व्यभिचारिणी ॥ १६६७ ॥
अन्यवस्तुनि विज्ञानं जातं वा ज्ञायते कथम् ।
अप्रत्यक्षा मता बुद्धिर्येनार्थापत्तितो यदि ॥ १६६८ ॥
सापि ज्ञानात्मिकैवेति तस्या अपि कुतो गतिः ।
अर्थापत्त्यन्तरप्रोक्तावनवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥ १६६९ ॥
यदि वस्तु प्रमाभावो मेयाभावस्तथैव च ।
प्रत्यक्षेऽन्तर्गतो भावस्तथासति कथं न ते ॥ १६७० ॥

śakyadarśanavastvābhapratyakṣasyaiva nāstitā |
evaṃ sati samākhyeyo nānyeṣāṃ vyabhicāriṇī || 1667 ||
anyavastuni vijñānaṃ jātaṃ vā jñāyate katham |
apratyakṣā matā buddhiryenārthāpattito yadi || 1668 ||
sāpi jñānātmikaiveti tasyā api kuto gatiḥ |
arthāpattyantaraproktāvanavasthā prasajyate || 1669 ||
yadi vastu pramābhāvo meyābhāvastathaiva ca |
pratyakṣe'ntargato bhāvastathāsati kathaṃ na te || 1670 ||

[Under the circumstances] the ‘non-existence’ should be said to be of only that perception which envisages the perceptible object,—not of others; as that would be false.—How too is it known that the cognition of the other thing has come about, when cognitions themselves are not perceptible? If it is known through presumption, that too is of the nature of cognition,—how then is it itself cognised? If another presumption is suggested, then there is an infinite regress.—If the ‘negation of cognition’ is an entity, the ‘negation of the cognised object’ also should be the same. under the circumstances why do you not include ‘negation’ under ‘perception’ itself?—(1667-1670)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘Śakyadarśana’ is that thing the Perception of which is possible, i.e. what is perceptible. ‘Ābhā’ is form, figure;—hence what is meant is that Perception which envisages the perceptible thing.

‘Not of others’—i.e. of Inference and the rest; because what is cognised through these is imperceptible; and the absence of these is not followed by the absence or negation of things removed in time, place and nature; so that the absence or negation of these would be false (if brought forward as bringing about the Negation of these things). Hence there would be no sense in adding the term ‘and the rest’ in the phrase ‘negation of Perception and the rest

Further, if ‘the cognition of a thing other than that’ were definite and certain,—then it must be admitted that it proves the absence of the counter-entity. Otherwise, if the Negation were proved as merely existing, then it would mean that the negation in question has become cognised by all men, through the said ‘cognition of the other thing’ appearing in any one person only. In that case, how could the Mīmāṃsaka, who regards Cognition as imperceptible, become cognisant of that ‘Cognition of another thing’?—He would never be able to cognise it.

‘If through Presumption’;—‘if it is cognised’—this has to be construed here, from the Context;—as has been asserted in the statement—‘As there can be no idea of the object that is not cognised, the cognition of the thing is inferred from the inferential indicative in the shape of the Idea of the thing’;—here the term ‘inferential indicative’ stands for Presumption;—and ‘cognition of the thing’ means that cognition which can be explained otherwise than on the basis of the said Presumption;—‘inferred’ stands for definitely cognised.

In that case, as this Presumption also would be a Cognition,—it has to be explained how it is itself cognised.

If the answer be that “it is cognised through another Presumption”,—then, there would be an infinite regress.

Then again, if the idea of Negation being an entity is admitted, then, just as the ‘negation of the Means of Cognition’ is an entity, the ‘negation of the object cognised’ also should be an entity; and in that ease, being an entity, why cannot Negation be regarded as cognised through Perception itself? In that case there would be no need for postulating a distinct Means of Cognition for the Cognition of Negation.—(1667-1670)