The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]
by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588
This page contains verse 1671 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1671.
Verse 1671
Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:
कार्यादीनामभावो हि भावो यः कारणादिना ।
स चापरविविक्तात्मा प्रत्यक्षेणैव गम्यते ॥ १६७१ ॥kāryādīnāmabhāvo hi bhāvo yaḥ kāraṇādinā |
The ‘negation of the effect’ consists in the presence of the cause; and this latter is of a nature distinct from the other, and is apprehended by perception itself.—(1671)
sa cāparaviviktātmā pratyakṣeṇaiva gamyate || 1671 ||
Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):
The following Text supports the same idea of Negation being included under Perception:—[see verse 1671 above]
It has been declared (by Kumārila himself, see Text 1655 above) that ‘The Negation of the effect consists in the presence of the Cause’; and this ‘presence of the Cause’ is of a nature—character—distinct from the Effect; and it is apprehended by Perception itself; so that what other aspect of ‘Negation’ is left to be cognised, for the sake of which Negation would be a distinct Means of Cognition
This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one Means of Cognition has no cognisable object other than that of another Means of Cognition, then it cannot be a distinct Means of Cognition;—e.g. a seventh Means of Cognition,—‘Negation’ has no cognisable object apart from what is cognised by Perception; hence the assumption of such a distinct Means of Cognition would be failing in the fulfilment of the wider condition.—(1671.)
The Opponent urges the ‘inadmissibility’ of the Reason adduced in this argument—[see verses 1672-1673 next]