Verse 1450-1455

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

व्यक्तिरूपस्य नाशेऽपि तिष्ठत्येवाकृतिस्तयोः ।
यदि न क्षणभङ्गाप्तेर्भावे तस्या अपि ध्रुवम् ॥ १४५० ॥
प्रत्यक्षदृष्टः सम्बन्धो ययोरेव विशेषयोः ।
इत्ययं नियमश्चोक्तो युष्माभिः केन हेतुना ॥ १४५१ ॥
दृष्ट्वैकदानुमानेन तस्यैव ह्यनुमा पुनः ।
प्रमाणं नेष्यते कस्मात्को विशेषो हि पूर्वके ॥ १४५२ ॥
विज्ञातार्थाधिगन्तृत्वान्न प्रमाणमिदं यदि ।
स्मार्त्तवत्प्राक्तनोऽप्येतत्समानं किं न वीक्ष्यते ॥ १४५३ ॥
अन्तरालप्रवृत्तस्य सन्देहस्य निवर्त्तनात् ।
आधिक्यं तत्र चेदेतदत्रापि सदृशं न किम् ॥ १४५४ ॥
तस्मात्किमस्ति नास्तीति सन्देहविनिवृत्तिकृत् ।
स एवेति निराकाङ्क्षमेतत्सामान्यदर्शनम् ॥ १४५५ ॥

vyaktirūpasya nāśe'pi tiṣṭhatyevākṛtistayoḥ |
yadi na kṣaṇabhaṅgāpterbhāve tasyā api dhruvam || 1450 ||
pratyakṣadṛṣṭaḥ sambandho yayoreva viśeṣayoḥ |
ityayaṃ niyamaścokto yuṣmābhiḥ kena hetunā || 1451 ||
dṛṣṭvaikadānumānena tasyaiva hyanumā punaḥ |
pramāṇaṃ neṣyate kasmātko viśeṣo hi pūrvake || 1452 ||
vijñātārthādhigantṛtvānna pramāṇamidaṃ yadi |
smārttavatprāktano'pyetatsamānaṃ kiṃ na vīkṣyate || 1453 ||
antarālapravṛttasya sandehasya nivarttanāt |
ādhikyaṃ tatra cedetadatrāpi sadṛśaṃ na kim || 1454 ||
tasmātkimasti nāstīti sandehavinivṛttikṛt |
sa eveti nirākāṅkṣametatsāmānyadarśanam || 1455 ||

If what is meant is that—“even on the destruction of the individual, the universal persists”,—then, that cannot be; because even if the universal existed, that also would certainly be covered by the ‘perpetual flux’.—Further, on what grounds have you asserted the restriction that “these same two particulars whose relationship has been cognised by sense-perception, etc. etc.” (text 1443)?—Then again, having once cognised a thing by means of inference, if the same thing is cognised again by means of inference,—why is not this latter regarded as valid? What is the peculiarity in the previous one (whereby it is regarded as valid, and not the later one)?—If it be urged that—“the later one is not regarded as valid because like remembrance, it apprehends what has been already apprehended”,—then why is not the previous inference also regarded as the same?—If it be argued that—“in the former inference there is this additional peculiarity that it sets aside the doubt that has set in during the interval,”—why is not the same in the latter also? Hence it is this latter itself that sets aside the doubt as to something being present or not present; and hence the generalised perception is really what is independent.—(1450-1455)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged:—“Though the Individual is fleeting (momentary), yet the Universal is something not fleeting; and on this basis, the sameness or unity would be real, and the Inference would not be devoid of an object”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 1450-1455 above]

‘Ākṛti’—The Universal.

‘Even if’—i.e. granting that such a thing as the Universal exists.

The other party regards the Individual and the Universal as identical; how then can the Universal continue to exist when the Individual is destroyed? If it did, then, having different fates, they would have to be regarded as distinct from one another.

‘If it exists’—This also is only by way of being granted; as in reality, the Universal having been once for all rejected, how could it exist?—‘If it exists’—i.e. even if it existed;—it would be in ‘perpetual flux’; as the ‘perpetual flux’ has been proved to be all-embracing.

Further, when a thing has been once cognised by means of an Inference,—and later on, the same thing (Fire) is cognised by another Inference drawn from the same Inferential Indicative Probans), (Smoke),—why has not this latter Inference also been cited as one based upon Perceived Particulars,—when the qualification of having been ‘cognised by Perception’ is considered desirable?

It might be argued that—“It has not been so regarded as it apprehends what has been already apprehended”.

That cannot be right; as the same applies also to what is based on Perceived Particulars.

“In the case of that based upon Perceived Particulars, there is this additional peculiarity that it has set at rest the doubt that has appeared during the interval.”

That cannot be right; as this same peculiarity is also present in what is based upon the Inferred Particulars.

Thus from all this it follows that when all things are in a ‘perpetual flux’, the only Inference possible is that based upon generalised Relationship, not any based upon Perceived Particulars.—(1450-1455)