Verse 1315-1320

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तद्भावभाविता साक्षादसिद्धा व्यभिचारिणी ।
पारम्पर्येण सा तस्यां स्मृतिबुद्धौ समन्वयात् ॥ १३१५ ॥
तद्विकारविकारित्वं पारम्पर्योद्भवेष्वपि ।
कार्येषु दृश्यते लोके व्यक्तं वेगसरादिषु ॥ १३१६ ॥
मानस्यो भ्रान्तयः सर्वा निवर्त्तन्ते विचारतः ।
इत्यस्मिन्व्यभिचारित्वं भावसामान्यबुद्धिभिः ॥ १३१७ ॥
वस्तुस्वलक्षणे नैताः प्रवर्त्तन्ते स्वभावतः ।
एवं तद्विनिवृत्तिश्चेत्तुल्यं चन्द्रद्वयादिषु ॥ १३१८ ॥
न सत्ताविनिवृत्तिश्चेत्समं सामान्यबुद्धिषु ।
नचेश्वरादिभ्रान्तीनां तन्मताभिनिवेशिनाम् ॥ १३१९ ॥
युक्तिकोटिश्रवेऽप्यस्ति निवृत्तिः प्रत्युत स्वयम् ।
नैता युक्तय इत्येवं ते वदन्ति जडाः पुनः ॥ १३२० ॥

tadbhāvabhāvitā sākṣādasiddhā vyabhicāriṇī |
pāramparyeṇa sā tasyāṃ smṛtibuddhau samanvayāt || 1315 ||
tadvikāravikāritvaṃ pāramparyodbhaveṣvapi |
kāryeṣu dṛśyate loke vyaktaṃ vegasarādiṣu || 1316 ||
mānasyo bhrāntayaḥ sarvā nivarttante vicārataḥ |
ityasminvyabhicāritvaṃ bhāvasāmānyabuddhibhiḥ || 1317 ||
vastusvalakṣaṇe naitāḥ pravarttante svabhāvataḥ |
evaṃ tadvinivṛttiścettulyaṃ candradvayādiṣu || 1318 ||
na sattāvinivṛttiścetsamaṃ sāmānyabuddhiṣu |
naceśvarādibhrāntīnāṃ tanmatābhiniveśinām || 1319 ||
yuktikoṭiśrave'pyasti nivṛttiḥ pratyuta svayam |
naitā yuktaya ityevaṃ te vadanti jaḍāḥ punaḥ || 1320 ||

“(a) as regards the reason that ‘the illusion is there only when the sense-organ is there’,—in its direct sense, it is-inadmissible; and in its indirect sense, it is inconclusive; as it is present in remembrance also.—(b) as regards the reason ‘illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the sense-organ’,—that is clearly found also in the case of effects produced indirectly,—for example, in the case of the mule and such things.—(c) as regards the idea’ that ‘all mental illusions cease after reflection’,—this also is not quite true (inconclusive), in view of such ideas as-‘entity’ and ‘universal’. If it be held that these notions do cease on the subsequent notion that ‘these are not found in the specific individuality of things’,—then the answer is that such cessation is possible also in the case of such illusions as that of ‘two moons’.—If it be urged that the existence of these does not cease—then, the same may be said in regard to the notions of the universal, etc, also—as regards the illusions regarding god and such other beings, appearing in persons who are bent upon believing in them, there is no cessation at all, even on listening to millions of reasons; in fact, these dull-witted persons declare that these reasons are no reasons at all.”—(1315-1320)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

(a) If the fact of Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as a Reason in the direct sense, then it is Inadmissible for one or the other of the two parties; for the other party, it is not proved that Illusion is produced directly from the Sense-organs; as that is exactly what is still to be proved. On the other hand, if it is meant in the indirect sense, that the Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as the Reason;—then it is Inconclusive; because such indirect concomitance with the Sense-organ is present in Remembrance also (which is not regarded as Sense-born).

(b) As regards the Premiss that ‘the Illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the Sense-organ,’—that also is Inadmissible in the direct sense; and if taken in the indirect sense, this also is Inconclusive; as in the case of the Mule, which is born of the Mare from the Ass,—all the embryonic stages intervene between the contact of the animals and the birth of the Mule—and it is only when the final product is subsequently found to resemble the Ass that the idea comes about that it is born of the Ass; but that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is produced from the Ass directly.

(c) The assertion that “Mental Illusion ceases on reflection” is also Inconclusive,—in view of the ideas of Entity and Universal’, That is, for you the Buddhist,—who, relying on Reasoning, hold that there is no such thing as the Universal,—the generic idea that there is in regard to things like the Jar being ‘entities’ or ‘universals’ does not cease at all.—If you think that—“when one comes to reflect over them, the said ideas do disappear, through such notions as ‘these ideas do not appertain to the Specific Individuality”,—then we say that this is no answer at all. In the case of the Illusions regarding ‘Too Moons’ and the like,—when one comes to ponder over them, they also cease through the notion that ‘these do not appertain to the Specific Individuality’; and yet these do not become ‘mental’.

It might be urged that “the existence of these does not cease”.

The same may be said in regard to the notions of the Universal, etc. also; as the existence of these also does not cease.—(1315-1320)

The following Texts supply the Author’s answer to the above arguments:—[see verses 1321-1321 next]