Verse 1321-1323

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

तद्भावभाविता साक्षान्न सिद्धाऽभ्रान्तचेतसा ।
व्यवधानं न सिद्धं हि न हि तद्वेद्यतेऽन्तरा ॥ १३२१ ॥
अन्यार्थासक्तचित्तोऽपि द्विचन्द्रादि समीक्षते ।
अविच्छिन्नमतो नास्ति पारम्पर्यसमुद्भवः ॥ १३२२ ॥
भावसामान्यबुद्धीनां प्रतिसंहारसम्भवे ।
निवृत्तिः संभवत्येव स्वेच्छयेशमतेरपि ॥ १३२३ ॥

tadbhāvabhāvitā sākṣānna siddhā'bhrāntacetasā |
vyavadhānaṃ na siddhaṃ hi na hi tadvedyate'ntarā || 1321 ||
anyārthāsaktacitto'pi dvicandrādi samīkṣate |
avicchinnamato nāsti pāramparyasamudbhavaḥ || 1322 ||
bhāvasāmānyabuddhīnāṃ pratisaṃhārasambhave |
nivṛttiḥ saṃbhavatyeva svecchayeśamaterapi || 1323 ||

The idea of the illusion being there when the sense-organ is there cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible’, in its direct sense. Because there is no intervention by any unmistaken (right) notion; as no such intervening right notion is ever apprehended.—Even when the man has his mind not turned to other things, he has the continuous perception of ‘two moons’; which shows that the production (of the illusion, by the sense-organ) is not indirect—as regards the ideas of ‘entity’, ‘universal’ and so forth,—where there is the possibility of their being retracted,—cessation is quite possible, if the person so wishes. So also in the case of the idea relating to god.—(1321-1323)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘Cannot be Inadmissible’,—i.e. it must be admissible.—Why?—Because there is no intervention by any unmistaken notion—of the One Moon—because while it would be cognisable if it were there, no such notion is cognised at all.

This same idea is made clear in the sentence—‘Even when the man, etc, etc.’.—‘Continuous’—is to be construed with ‘perception of the Two Moons’.

For this same reason the Premiss, that ‘illusion is an aberration produced by the aberration of the Sense-organ’, also is not ‘Inconclusive As this also is not interrupted,—in view of which the case of the Mule would render it false, inconclusive.

As regards the notions of ‘Entity’, ‘Universal’ and so forth,—when the person retracts them by bis own wish, there is cessation of these also.

But in the case of the Illusions like that of the ‘Hair-tuft’, there can be no retraction at will; hence our premiss is not Inconclusive.

It might be argued that—“even in the case of Perception through the Senses, there can be cessation at will, by closing one’s eyes for instance”.

The Visual Perception does not cease immediately on the appearance of the wish; in fact what is brought about by the man’s wish is only the closing of the eyes; and it is only when the Eyes have ceased to function that the Visual Perception ceases. In the case of mental Illusion, on the other hand, it ceases directly after the wash of the man; hence the two cases are not analogous, It has to be borne in mind that, when the Eyes are fixed upon a thing, even though the man may not wish to look at the thing, the thing is actually seen; so that the wish has no direct influence upon the Visual or other Perceptions.—(1321-1323)