Verse 1286-1288

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अस्ति ह्यालोचनाज्ञानमाद्यं चेन्निर्विकल्पकम् ।
बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ॥ १२८६ ॥
न विशेषो न सामान्यं तदानीमनुभूयते ।
तयोराधारभूता तु व्यक्तिरेवावसीयते ॥ १२८७ ॥
ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यया ।
बुद्ध्याऽवसीयते सापि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन संमता ॥ १२८८ ॥

asti hyālocanājñānamādyaṃ cennirvikalpakam |
bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam || 1286 ||
na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīmanubhūyate |
tayorādhārabhūtā tu vyaktirevāvasīyate || 1287 ||
tataḥ paraṃ punarvastu dharmairjātyādibhiryayā |
buddhyā'vasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena saṃmatā || 1288 ||

“At first there is only a pre-cognition, which is non-conceptual, like the cognition of the infant and the dumb and the like;—it is born purely of the thing (cognised); at that moment, neither the universal nor the particular character is apprehended; all that is apprehended is only a certain individual which is the substratum of both those characters.—(Ślokavārtika—sense-perception, 112-113).—Subsequently, the thing becomes apprehended along with the properties of the ‘class-character’ and the rest; and the cognition also by which it is thus apprehended is regarded as ‘sense-perception’.—(Ślokavārtika—sense-perception, 120).”—(1286-1288).

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

With the following Texts, the Author proceeds to present the view of Kumārila; and thereby indicates the charge against his own Reason (Premiss)—put forward (under Text 1257 above), to the effect that ‘when there is no basis for the existence of a thing in a certain form, that thing, in that form, cannot be admitted as real’,—that it is partly ‘inadmissible’ as not present in a part of the Subject of the Reasoning:—[see verses 1286-1288 above]

All sense-perceptions are made here the Subject (of the Argument); and the sense is that the Premiss (of the Buddhist)—that ‘the basis of conceptuality, in the shape of the apprehension of the thing qualified by qualifications, cannot be there’—is not admissible. Because, as a matter of fact, except in the initial Pre-cognition, in all other Sense-perceptions, ‘the apprehension of the thing as qualified by qualifications’ is present.—If the Buddhist puts forward his Premiss in reference to the Pre-cognition, then the argument is superfluous.

Such is the view of the Opponent (Kumārila).

‘Like the cognition of the infant and the dumb’;—i.e. like the infant’s cognition, and like the dumb person’s cognition.—‘And the rest’ is meant to include the man in a swoon. The only point of similarity in all these cases is the absence of association with words

‘Purely’;—what is meant by this ‘purity’ is freedom from the two Universals.

This same idea is made clearer in the second text (1287)—‘Neither the Universal nor the Particular, etc. etc.’—The term ‘Particular’ stands for the intermediate Universal, ‘Cow’ and the like; and ‘Universal’ for the Summum Genus, ‘Entity’ and the like,—‘The substratum of both these’;—this indicates the pure thing.

‘Subsequently, etc.’—This makes clear the partial ‘inadmissibility’ of the same Premiss. ‘Subsequently’—i.e after the apprehension of the apprehension of the pure thing,—that cognition, by which the thing is apprehended along with the qualifications of the class-character and the rest, is also regarded as ‘Sense-perception

‘By the class-character, etc.’—This indicates the apprehension of the Thing as qualified by qualifications.

This shows that the said cognition apprehends what has not been already apprehended:—and also that the Premiss (of the Buddhist) is inadmissible.—(1286-1288)