The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1270 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1270.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

विशिष्टविषयो बोधः कल्पना नेति साहसम् ।
न विशेषणसम्वन्धादृते वैशिष्ट्यसम्भवः ॥ १२७० ॥

viśiṣṭaviṣayo bodhaḥ kalpanā neti sāhasam |
na viśeṣaṇasamvandhādṛte vaiśiṣṭyasambhavaḥ || 1270 ||

“The assertion that the cognition apprehends a qualified thing, and yet it is not conceptual implies great temerity indeed! certainly, no ‘qualification’ is possible except through connection with qualifications.”—(1270)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

“From all this it follows that your assertion—that the Cognition apprehends a qualified object, and yet there is in it no Conceptual Content implies great temerity on your part, in making an assertion opposed to all canons of Right Cognition.”

This sums up the criticism against the Buddhist doctrine.

“The Reason for this is provided, in the words—‘Certainly no qualification, etc. etc.’—that is to say, just as a man does not become a stick-holder, without the stick,—so a thing cannot be qualified without connection with qualifications.—Hence that cognition which apprehends the qualifications is ‘Conceptual’ (with Conceptual Content).

“The argument may be formulated as follows:—The Apprehension of the qualified thing, which is under dispute, is Conceptual,—because it apprehends a qualified thing,—like the cognition ‘This is a piece of Cloth’.”—(1270)

The following Text proceeds to answer the above criticisms of Sumati:—[see verse 1271 next]

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