Verse 1257-1260

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यदिवा यस्ययदि चाप्यस्य भावस्य यद्रूपस्थितिकारणम् ।
न विद्यते न तत्त्वेन स व्यवस्थाप्यते बुधैः ॥ १२५७ ॥
अविद्यमानसास्नादिर्यथा कर्को गवात्मना ।
विशेषणविशिष्टार्थविशिष्टार्थं ग्रहणं न च विद्यते ॥ १२५८ ॥
सविकल्पकभावस्य स्थितेराक्षे निबन्धनम् ।
विपक्षः शाबलेयादिरन्यथाऽतिप्रसज्यते ॥ १२५९ ॥
नचाप्रसिद्धता हेतोर्जात्यादेः प्रतिषेधतः ।
भेदेन चापरिच्छेदान्नचास्त्येवं विशेषणम् ॥ १२६० ॥

yadivā yasyayadi cāpyasya bhāvasya yadrūpasthitikāraṇam |
na vidyate na tattvena sa vyavasthāpyate budhaiḥ || 1257 ||
avidyamānasāsnādiryathā karko gavātmanā |
viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthaviśiṣṭārthaṃ grahaṇaṃ na ca vidyate || 1258 ||
savikalpakabhāvasya sthiterākṣe nibandhanam |
vipakṣaḥ śābaleyādiranyathā'tiprasajyate || 1259 ||
nacāprasiddhatā hetorjātyādeḥ pratiṣedhataḥ |
bhedena cāparicchedānnacāstyevaṃ viśeṣaṇam || 1260 ||

Or again, when there is no basis for the existence of a thing in a certain form,—that thing in that form is not admitted as real, by the wise. For instance, the white horse is not admitted to be the cow because the dewlap and the other features of the cow are not present in the horse. In the case of sense-perception there is no reason for the presence of the determinate character (the character of being associated with conceptual content), which could bring about the apprehension of the thing along with its properties.—Spotted and other cows are instances to the contrary. If it were not so, it would lead to absurd contingencies.—The reason adduced cannot be said to be ‘unproven’ (or not-admitted); as the universal and other qualifying factors have all been rejected. Nor are the properties cognised as apart from those factors. Nor are there any such properties.—(1257-1260)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Having thus established—by means of Perception itself—the fact of Sense-perception being ‘free from Conceptual Content’,—the Author proceeds to prove it by means of Inference:—[see verses 1257-1260 above]

The argument may be thus formulated:—When the basis of the idea of a thing in a certain form is absent, that thing is not accepted by intelligent persons to be of that form;—for instance, the White Horse is not accepted as of the form of the Cow, because the basis of the ‘cow-idea’, in the shape of the dewlap and other characteristics of the Cow, is absent in the Horse;—in the case of Sense-perception, which is produced on the basis of the specific object Blue,—the basis for its being regarded as associated with Conceptual Content (i.e. Determinate), in the form of the apprehension of the object along with its properties, is absent; and thus there being no apprehension of the Cause [the effect, in the shape of its being associated with Conceptual Content cannot be there]. The Spotted and Black Cows supply the Corroborative Instance per contra. Lastly, there is the possibility of the incongruity that all things might become accepted to be of all forms and that the person accepting things would come to be regarded as stupid.—Such is the upshot of the Inference put forward.

‘Karka’ is white Horse.

‘Universal, etc.’—i.e. the qualifying factors (postulated by the Realists). Even if the Universal and the rest are real entities, our Reason is not ‘Unproven’;—this is what is meant by the words—‘Nor is the thing, etc.’; i.e. as apart from Colour and the rest which have been held to be qualified by the Properties (Universal, etc.).

Question: “If there is no cognition of Properties as distinct from what is qualified, then, why should it not be a qualifying factor?”

Answer:—‘Nor are there any such Properties’—i.e. as differentiated from the thing.

From all this it follows that there is no apprehension of anything along with its properties. Hence the Reason adduced by us cannot be said to be ‘Unproven’.—(1257-1260)