Verse 1181-1183

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ज्ञानाकारनिषेधस्तु स्ववेद्यत्वान्न शक्यते ।
विद्यते हि निरालम्बमारोपकमनेकधा ॥ ११८१ ॥
ज्ञानस्यात्मगतः कश्चिन्नियतः प्रतिगोचरम् ।
अवश्याभ्युपगन्तव्यः स्वभावश्च स एव च ॥ ११८२ ॥
अस्माभिरुक्त आकारः प्रतिबिम्बं तदाभता ।
उल्लेखः प्रतिभासश्च संज्ञाभेदस्त्वकारणम् ॥ ११८३ ॥

jñānākāraniṣedhastu svavedyatvānna śakyate |
vidyate hi nirālambamāropakamanekadhā || 1181 ||
jñānasyātmagataḥ kaścinniyataḥ pratigocaram |
avaśyābhyupagantavyaḥ svabhāvaśca sa eva ca || 1182 ||
asmābhirukta ākāraḥ pratibimbaṃ tadābhatā |
ullekhaḥ pratibhāsaśca saṃjñābhedastvakāraṇam || 1183 ||

As for the denial of the idealistic form of things,—such denial is impossible because the fact is self-evident; as actually there are several impositions without any basic reality.—It has to be admitted that there must be something in the idea (or cognition) itself which appertains specifically to each object envisaged by it; and that is precisely its ‘nature’;—and this same ‘nature’ of the idea has been spoken of by us as ‘form ‘reflected image’, ‘appearance’, ‘figuring’, ‘manifestation so that there is only a difference in the name, without any real difference.—(1181-1183)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued (under Text 980, by Kumārila) that—“Inasmuch as the idealistic form of things has been denied, nothing internal (purely subjective) can be denoted by words”.

The answer to that is as follows:—[see verses 1181-1183 above]

‘Impossible’—to make.

Question:—“In what way is the fact of the Thing being of the form of the Idea (cognition) self-evident?”

Answer:—‘As actually there are, etc, etc.’.—In Dreams and other forms of cognition, it is found that, even in the absence of a real substratum, there are imposed cognitions, clearly known to the meanest cowherd,—and this fact is self-evident to every man in his own experience. It cannot be right to say that “in these cases what is cognised is the realng as existing at other places and at other times”;—because the thing cognised is not cognised in that form; and one thing cannot be cognised in the form of any other thing; for if it did, then it would lead to an absurdity.

Further, you will have to admit that there is some peculiarity in the Cognition itself due to the cognised object,—by virtue of which, even though as Cognition, every Cognition is the same, yet every individual cognition differs from the other, so that in one there is apprehension of the Blue, not of the Yellow colour; and on this basis there is a differentiation in Cognition.—And when you admit this, then, by implication, it would also become admitted that the Cognition has form. Because without such form it would be impossible to definitely ascertain the particular nature of the Cognition. Hence what you speak of as the ‘nature’ of the Cognition is nothing other than what we speak of as ‘Form’, ‘Figuring’ and so forth; so that the only dispute between us is one regarding names.—(1181-1183)